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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates how a multinational enterprise’s (MNE) corporate
headquarters governs its foreign subsidiaries. It draws on agency theory, prospect theory,
and corporate governance literatures to develop a framework that describes select MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms expected to predict foreign subsidiary
performance, measured as foreign subsidiary survival and profitability.
To test this framework, I first conducted a pilot Canadian study. It was followed
by the main multi-country study. The Canadian study used mixed methods. It analyzed
quantitative data, compiled from different sources, and qualitative data, collected through
personal interviews with subsidiary managers. The main multi-country study used
survival analysis, multinomial logistic regression, and binary logistic regression
techniques to perform various analyses on large longitudinal datasets and sub-datasets for
the years 2000-2008 collected from a variety of sources.
The Canadian study showed that Japanese MNE parents of Canadian foreign
subsidiaries that had high survival likelihoods were governed through nonlinearly higher
MNE parent ownership (increasing logarithmic relationship), the use of greater numbers
of expatriates (increasing logarithmic relationship), and the adoption of lower levels of
risk (decreasing s-shaped relationship), by their MNE corporate headquarters.
The main multi-country study confirmed most of the findings of the Canadian
study and provided new findings that demonstrated that foreign subsidiaries that were
more likely to survive also tended to be governed by regional headquarters (RHQ) in
addition to corporate headquarters (CHQ). It also showed that MNE parent ownership
ii

and the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary interact with each other. They thus
tend to complement and/or substitute for each other as MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance mechanisms predicting foreign subsidiary survival. Further, it showed that
although these select MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms
(ownership, expatriates, risk, and RHQ) predict a foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood,
they do not predict a foreign subsidiary’s profitability. This suggests that the use of MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms may improve the survival but not
necessarily the profits of foreign subsidiaries. Implications for agency theory, prospect
theory, classical corporate governance, and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
research as well as implications for directors and managers are discussed.

Keywords
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance; parent-subsidiary governance;
subsidiary governance; subsidiary control; agency theory; prospect theory; corporate
governance; governance mechanisms; ownership; expatriates; risk; regional headquarters
(RHQ); multi-method; mixed-method; performance; survival; profitability; interviews;
Japan; Canada; multi-country; MNE; MNC.
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CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION

International corporate governance (ICG) research has grown rapidly in recent
decades (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). However, most research in this area focuses on
comparing and contrasting governance systems across countries or regions (Denis &
McConnell, 2003). Yet, surprisingly limited attention has been given to MNE corporate
governance and particularly the governance of foreign subsidiaries by their multinational
parents (Luo, 2005) (for exceptions see Brellochs (2007), Kim, Prescott, & Kim (2005),
and Costello (2002)).
MNEs dominate the global economy and are becoming ever more
internationalized. Many foreign subsidiaries, although they may be wholly owned by
their MNE parent, are themselves gigantic enterprises. For example, as of December
2012, Toyota Motor, the world’s eighth largest company by revenues (265.7$b) on the
Fortune Global 500 (Fortune, 2013), had 52 overseas manufacturing companies in 27
countries and regions. It operated huge foreign subsidiaries in Canada, the U.S., Latin
America, Europe, Russia, China and other countries. Thus shedding more light on MNE
corporate governance practices and particularly on the governance of foreign subsidiaries
by their MNE parents is both necessary and important (Luo, 2005; Starbuck, 2014).
Senior consultants from the Entity Governance and Compliance team at
PricewaterhouseCoopers observe that “Quite often when you look at corporate
governance failings, they’ve occurred at the subsidiary level” (Gibson, Elsdon, &
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Johnson, 2013). One recent example that illustrates this observation is the governance
failure at Wal-Mart’s largest foreign subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico. During April
2012, news broke that executives at Wal-Mart de Mexico had bribed Mexican authorities
in previous years to ease expansion in that country and that executives at the company’s
headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas, had been alerted to the bribery but did not take
action because of concerns about possible legal, reputational, and financial harm to the
company (Barstow, 2012). Such examples suggest that poor MNE parent-foreign
subsidiary governance can threaten the performance of foreign subsidiaries and their
MNE parents.
Perhaps one of the most well-known recent cases that supports Gibson et al.’s
(2013) observation is the 2010 MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance failure that
contributed to BP’s Gulf of Mexico oil disaster and its ramifications on the performance
of BP’s US subsidiary and the BP corporation as a whole (Tricker, 2012). BP’s Gulf of
Mexico oil spill cost BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP’s Texas-based subsidiary
responsible for Gulf of Mexico oil exploration and production, the death of 11 of its
employees and the blowout of its Gulf of Mexico Macondo’s well. It also cost the BP
corporation more than $4.5 billion in fines and penalties, the largest criminal resolution in
U.S. history (Goldenberg & Rushe, 2012). Furthermore, it resulted in a downgrade in
BP’s credit rating (Logendran, 2010) and a sharp decline in its stock price, a drop of
around 50% in its share value in 50 days (Smith, 2011). In addition, on 25 June 2010
BP’s shares reached a low of $26.97 per share costing BP a total loss of $100 billion in
market value (Hays & Schnurr, 2010).
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There is an abundance of research on classical (or domestic) corporate
governance and international corporate governance (for literature reviews see Daily,
Dalton, and Cannella (2003b), Denis (2001), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Aguilera and
Jackson (2010), Denis and McConnell (2003)). Moreover, there is an abundance of
research linking classical corporate governance / international corporate governance and
performance (e.g. Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007); Bhagat and Bolton (2008);
Renders, Gaeremynck, and Sercu (2010); Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008);
Kaplan (1997); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Ho (2005)). In contrast, there is
limited research on MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance (Luo, 2005) and there is
virtually no research examining the impact of MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability. This dissertation is an initial attempt to
fill this gap in the literature.

1.1. Purpose of this Dissertation
This dissertation studies the phenomenon of MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance. It goes beyond studying the corporate governance structures of domestic
companies or MNE-parents themselves, such as the parent’s ownership structure, the
parent’s board structure, and the parent’s executive compensation structure, to study the
corporate governance mechanisms between the MNE parent and its foreign subsidiaries
and their impact on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability. A foreign subsidiary
company refers to a partially or wholly owned company that is 1) part of a larger
corporation with headquarters in another country, and 2) incorporated under the laws of
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the country it is located in (BusinessDictionary.com, 2014). Thus this thesis attempts to
answer the following research questions: (1) how do MNE parents govern their foreign
subsidiaries to ensure better performance measured as foreign subsidiary survival and
foreign subsidiary profitability, and (2) why they govern these foreign subsidiaries that
way.
To answer these research questions this study starts with the MNE parent-foreign
subsidiary governance phenomenon then draws on agency theory (Berle & Means, 1932;
Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman,
1986, 1992), classical corporate governance, and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
relationships literatures to develop a theoretical framework to help better explain this
phenomenon.
In developing this theoretical framework and deciding which MNE parent-foreign
subsidiary governance mechanisms would impact foreign subsidiary performance the
most, I followed three steps. First I observed and scanned the broad classical corporate
governance phenomena and landscape. Then I focused on internal classical corporate
governance and its mechanisms. Finally I drew parallels between internal classical
corporate governance mechanisms and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
mechanisms to develop the theoretical model that I use to help better explain the parentsubsidiary governance phenomenon. This process is described in more detail in the
following three sections.

5

1.2. Definition and Landscape of Classical Corporate Governance
Robert Tricker, the founder-editor of the research journal Corporate Governance:
An International Review in 1993, defines corporate governance as “the way power is
exercised over corporate entities. It covers the activities of the board and its relationships
with the shareholders or members, and with those managing the enterprise, as well as
with the external auditors, regulators, and other legitimate stakeholders [italics added]
(Tricker, 2012: 4).” He adds that “Corporate governance is different from management.
Executive management is responsible for running the enterprise, but the governing body
ensures that it is running in the right direction and being run well. Directors are so-called
because they are responsible for setting the organization’s direction, formulating strategy,
and policymaking. Further, the board is responsible for supervising management and
being accountable. Overall, the board is responsible for the organization’s decisions and
its performance (Tricker, 2012: 4).” Based on his corporate governance definition,
Tricker (2012: 32) then provides a schematic depiction of the classical corporate
governance landscape and its participants (see Figure 1.1).
Taking a closer look at Figure 1.1, one can divide the participants in the classical
corporate governance space into internal classical corporate governance participants (i.e.
participants internal to the domestic company) and external classical corporate
governance participants (i.e. participants external to the domestic company). Internal
classical corporate governance participants include shareholders, board of directors
(BOD), and management. External classical corporate governance participants include
stock markets for listed companies, finance markets (equity and debt), market

6

intermediaries, external auditors, contractual stakeholders (e.g. employees, suppliers,
customers, etc.), government and other corporate regulators, media, and societal
influence and other stakeholders.

7

Figure 1.1 Scope of Classical Corporate Governance
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1.3. Internal Classical Corporate Governance Participants and Mechanisms
Given that “central to corporate governance thinking and practice are the
shareholders, the board of directors, and the management. [And that] …corporate
governance codes focus on this set of players, as does much company law (Tricker, 2012:
31)” and given that I believe that companies can shape their external circumstances
through their internal behaviors, this thesis focuses on internal corporate governance
participants and mechanisms as compared to external corporate governance participants
and mechanisms. Generally in the internal classical corporate governance space,
shareholders appoint board members to oversee the management of the company they
own. Thus, shareholders mainly govern the company they own through their ownershiplevel mechanism and through their other board-level mechanisms. The ownership-level
mechanism refers to the ownership concentrations of the shareholders in the company
they own. The board-level mechanisms include BOD special committees (e.g. risk
committee,

audit

committee,

compensation

committee,

nominating

committee,

governance committee, etc.), capital structure (e.g. debt, equity), organizational structure
(e.g. functional structure, multidivisional structure (M-form structure), matrix structure,
etc.), executive compensation (e.g. fixed/variable, money/shares/options, short/long term
targets), employee participation, etc.
Ownership, BOD, risk, and organizational structure are among the most important
mechanisms used to govern companies. As a result, I focus on the ownership (i.e.
ownership concentration), BOD, risk (i.e. risk committee and capital structure / debt
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level), and organizational structure internal classical corporate governance mechanisms
shown in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2 Focal Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Shareholders

Internal classical CG Mechanisms
(Ownership & BOD):
 Ownership concentration
 BOD
 Special Committees (Risk
Committee)
 Capital structure (debt, equity)
 Organizational structure

Management

Performance
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1.4. MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Phenomenon, Definition, and
Mechanisms
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance phenomenon, more particularly, how MNE parents govern their foreign
subsidiaries to ensure better foreign subsidiary performance. To develop a framework
that describes the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms expected to
impact foreign subsidiary performance one has to define MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance before moving to the third previously mentioned step, drawing parallels
between internal classical corporate governance mechanisms and MNE parent-foreign
subsidiary governance mechanisms.
Luo (2005) defines MNE governance as “the system that not only monitors the
relationship[s] between executives and stakeholders (including shareholders) but also
directs … [an MNE’s] various globally dispersed businesses and pinpoints the
distribution of power, rights and responsibilities among critical participants in the
corporate-level [and subsidiary-level] decision-making process that affects worldwide
corporate affairs [italics added]”.
Building on Luo’s definition, I define MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
as the system that directs and monitors the relationships between a foreign subsidiary and
its stakeholders (among which the MNE parent is typically a major stakeholder /
shareholder) and identifies the distribution of power, rights, and responsibilities among
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key participants in the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary decision-making process that
affects the MNE parent’s and foreign subsidiary’s affairs.
Based on this definition, plus agency theory, prospect theory, and the previously
discussed focal internal classical corporate governance mechanisms, I develop the MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance framework in Figure 1.3 that describes MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms that are parallel to the internal
classical corporate governance mechanisms in Figure 1.2 and that are expected to impact
foreign subsidiary performance.
In Figure 1.3, ownership (which refers to the MNE parent’s ownership in the
foreign subsidiary), expatriates (which refers to the expatriates in the foreign subsidiary),
risk (which refers to the risk orientation of the foreign subsidiary), and regional
headquarters (which refers to whether the foreign subsidiary is governed by a RHQ) are
respectively parallel to ownership concentration, BOD, risk committee and capital
structure, and organizational structure in Figure 1.2. In the case of expatriates and BOD,
I consider them parallel because I consider individual expatriates as having a foreign
subsidiary governance role similar to individual directors’ corporate governance role.
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Figure 1.3 MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Mechanisms Studied in this Thesis

MNE Parent-Foreign
Subsidiary Governance
Mechanisms
Ownership
MNE Parent
(as shareholder)

Expatriates
Risk
Regional
Headquarters

Foreign Subsidiary
Performance
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1.5. Agency Theory and Prospect Theory
Agency theory was used to select the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
mechanisms expected to impact foreign subsidiary performance and to develop
hypotheses relating these MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms to
foreign subsidiary performance. To develop my hypotheses I use agency theory to argue
that, relative to MNE parents with foreign subsidiaries that are less likely to survive,
MNE parents with foreign subsidiaries that are more likely to survive, use higher
ownership and expatriates and tend to use RHQ as MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance mechanisms. MNE parents use these governance mechanisms to align the
interests, goals, and outcomes of their foreign subsidiaries with theirs to reduce parent
(principal)-subsidiary (agent) agency problems, which are expected to increase their
foreign subsidiaries survival. I also use agency theory to argue that although these MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms may impact foreign subsidiary
survival, they may not necessarily predict subsidiary profitability.
I draw on prospect theory to explain why risk orientation impacts foreign
subsidiary survival but not necessarily foreign subsidiary profitability. I use prospect
theory for three reasons. The first is to explain that firms follow three risk orientations,
namely, extreme risk-averting orientation, moderate risk-taking orientation, and
excessive risk-seeking orientation. The second is to argue that firms following the
moderate risk-taking orientation are assumed to be rational actors whereas firms
following the extreme risk-averting orientation and the excessive risk-seeking orientation
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are assumed to be boundedly rational actors. The third is to argue that within each
orientation some firms behave in an even more rational manner than their peers while
others behave in an even more biased manner than their peers. More details about this are
provided in the hypothesis development for risk orientation.

1.6. Thesis Studies and Organization
To answer the previously mentioned two research questions I conduct two studies,
a pilot Canadian study and a main multi-country study. The pilot Canadian study utilizes
a Canadian sample and analyzes the relationships between ownership, expatriates, and
risk orientation (but not RHQ) relative to survival. This study follows a multi-method
approach. To answer the first research question I gather archival data on the ownership,
expatriates, and risk orientation mechanisms that Japanese MNEs use to govern their
Canadian subsidiaries and build a survival model to test my hypotheses and present my
quantitative results. To help answer the second research question I conduct interviews
with Canadian subsidiary board members, CEOs, and top management team (TMT)
members. I then analyze these interviews and present my qualitative results.
The main multi-country study utilizes a multi-country sample and analyzes the
relationships between ownership, expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ relative to
survival and profitability. This study addresses the first research question using a very
large sample of Japanese MNEs with foreign subsidiaries in a range of countries and
regions. Here, I test the impact of the selected MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
mechanisms on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability.
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I investigate the impact of MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
mechanisms on both foreign subsidiary survival and foreign subsidiary profitability for
several reasons. First, I believe that profitability tends to be a shorter term measure of
performance while survival tends to be a longer term measure of performance. That is
because in this thesis subsidiary profitability is conceptualized and measured as a
subsidiary’s financial performance in a specific year whereas subsidiary survival is
conceptualized and measured as, whether and for how long. a subsidiary survives over
the years.
Second, although Mitchell (1994) and Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and Bell
(1997) justify their use of survival as a performance measure based on its moderate
correlation with subsidiary profitability, Makino and Beamish (1998) and Delios and
Beamish (2001) show that these two performance measures are distinct and do not
necessarily co-vary. Third, I want to compare the effect of MNE parent-foreign
subsidiary governance mechanisms on survival with their impact on profitability because
I believe that these same governance mechanisms may predict foreign subsidiary survival
but not necessarily foreign subsidiary profitability.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two develops the
arguments for the six general hypotheses, related to ownership, expatriates, and risk
orientation, that I test in the quantitative and qualitative pilot Canadian study. It also
develops the arguments for two additional general hypotheses related to RHQ and an
interaction hypothesis that I additionally test in the main multi-country study.
Chapter Three includes the methods and results of the pilot Canadian study.
Chapter Four includes the methods and results of the main multi-country study. Chapter
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Five includes the discussion of the Canadian and multi-country studies. Table 1.1
presents the different hypotheses that are considered in the pilot and main studies.

Table 1.1 Hypotheses Considered in the Pilot and Main Studies
Pilot Canadian
Study: Canadian
sample with
survival as
dependent variable)
H1a: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary

has a positive nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign
subsidiary’s survival.
H1b: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary
has a negligible effect on that foreign subsidiary’s
profitability.
H2a: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a

positive nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign
subsidiary’s survival.
H2b: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a
negligible effect on its profitability.
H3a: The relationship between parent risk orientation and
foreign subsidiary survival is nonlinear (declining s-shaped),
with the slope negative for parents with an extremely risk
averse orientation, positive for parents with a moderate risktaking orientation, and negative for parents with an
excessively risk-seeking orientation (see Figure 2.1).
H3b: An MNE parent’s risk orientation has a negligible
effect on its foreign subsidiary’s profitability.
H4a: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional
headquarters (RHQs) in the regions where these foreign
subsidiaries operate are more likely to survive than their
counterparts of parents without RHQs in the regions where
they operate.
H4b: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional
headquarters (RHQs) in the regions where these foreign
subsidiaries operate do not necessarily financially perform
better than their counterparts of parents without RHQs in
the regions where they operate.
H5: Expatriates modify the effect of ownership on foreign
subsidiary survival; the effect of MNE parent ownership on
foreign subsidiary survival is stronger (weaker) when the
number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is lower
(higher).

Main Multi-Country
Study: Global
sample with survival
and profitability as
dependent variables)
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CHAPTER 2
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

With MNEs’ increasing internationalization and dominance in the global
economy, it has become more pressing to study MNE governance in general and MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance in particular. However, despite its importance,
MNE governance and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance research was almost
nonexistent before the 2000s (Delios, 2011). Furthermore, despite calls for papers on
MNE governance (e.g. Delios, 2011; Luo, 2005; Rahman, 2011; Strange, Filatotchev,
Buck, & Wright, 2009) research in these areas has grown only slowly since then, perhaps
due to the limited availability of MNE governance data. What follows is a literature
review of the few studies on MNE and foreign subsidiary governance.
In a quantitative empirical study, Lippert and Rahman (1999) find that CEO
compensation of domestic companies (DCs) is more aligned with equity performance
than that of multinational corporations (MNCs). They further find that DCs and MNCs
use corporate governance constructs and mechanisms differently.
Kim et al. (2005) conceptually argue that MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance must respond to different levels of agency problems related to varying
strategic roles of foreign subsidiaries. They further argue that varying governance
structures for each foreign subsidiary leads to better overall MNE performance.
Kiel, Hendry, and Nicholson (2006), also in a conceptual paper, propose four
governance frameworks for subsidiary companies: (1) Direct Control, (2) Dual
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Reporting, (3) Advisory Board, and (4) Local Board. They then provide
recommendations on when each would lead to improved overall MNE performance.
Brellochs (2007), in a qualitative PhD thesis based on agency theory’s
predictions, finds that there are three categories of subsidiary governance mechanisms.
He argues that the mechanisms in the categories aimed at reducing goal incongruence and
managerial discretion are more important than those in the category aimed at decreasing
information asymmetry. Furthermore, he finds that a subsidiary’s governance
mechanisms are contingent on the subsidiary’s local environment and the MNE group
that the subsidiary is part of.
Finally, Costello and Costello (2010), in a quantitative empirical study, find that
there are three types of subsidiary governance bundles, those that respectively depend on
parent-centered governance mechanisms, subsidiary-centered governance mechanisms,
and parent- and subsidiary- centered governance mechanisms. They argue that the
MNE’s international strategy, its subsidiary’s importance, its subsidiary’s environmental
uncertainty, and its subsidiary’s age are factors that help predict what type of subsidiary
governance bundle an MNE will use to align the interests of its headquarters with those
of a particular subsidiary.
In this thesis I draw on agency theory following Filatotchev and Wright’s (2011)
call for a greater focus on agency theory to understand corporate governance in MNEs.
Most of the empirical literature on classical (domestic) corporate governance is grounded
in agency theory and focuses on associating different corporate governance mechanisms
with performance (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). This study extends agency theory to link
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different MNE parent-subsidiary governance mechanisms with foreign subsidiary
survival and profitability, a phenomenon that has been under-researched.
Agency theory attempts to explain the agency problem, that is, the principal-agent
problem, the agency relationship, the mitigation of the agency problem, and agency costs
(Clarke, 2004; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It assumes that principals and agents are self-interested
rational utility-maximizers and thus have divergent interests. The agency problem arises
when agents pursue their self-interest at the expense of the maximization of the utility of
their principals. The agency relationship is defined as the implicit or explicit contract
under which the principal engages the agent to perform some service on his/her behalf
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent (Clarke, 2004).
To mitigate the agency problem, agency theory attempts to align the agent’s interests
with those of the principal by analyzing the optimal contract form and the optimal
governance structure (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The two most discussed agency problems are moral hazard and adverse selection.
Moral hazard arises when the principal cannot observe or monitor the agent’s actions.
Adverse selection arises when the principal cannot evaluate whether the agent’s actions
are in the principal’s best interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). Fundamentally, the agency
problem in general and the moral hazard and adverse selection problems in particular, are
problems of information asymmetry (Shapiro, 2005).
There are three broad types of agency costs: 1) “residual loss” (Fama & Jensen,
1983b) refers to costs which represent the financial loss that the principal incurs when the
agent pursues his/her self-interest at the principal’s expense, 2) monitoring costs refer to
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costs that the principal incurs to decrease the aberrant activities of the agent, and 3)
bonding costs refer to costs that the agent incurs to compensate the principal in case the
agent acts in ways that harm the principal (Clarke, 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983b).
Typically, the principal incurs monitoring costs to decrease the information asymmetry
between himself/herself and the agent and thus minimize residual loss. Monitoring costs
incurred by the principal are effective when they are less than the benefits gained from
reducing residual loss.
I extend agency theory to explain MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
relationships and their impact on the survival and profitability of foreign subsidiaries of
MNE parents. MNE parent-foreign subsidiary relationships can be considered principalagent relationships since MNE parents (i.e. principals) delegate decision-making
authority and responsibility to foreign subsidiaries (i.e. agents) (Nohria & Ghoshal,
1994). Physical, legal, political, and other distances make it even more difficult for MNE
parents than for domestic parents to observe and monitor their subsidiaries’ actions, let
alone assess whether these actions are in these parents’ best interests (Gong, 2003); thus,
exacerbating the adverse selection and moral hazard agency problems even more than in
traditional domestic companies.
I also draw on prospect theory to explain why and how the risk orientation MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanism impacts foreign subsidiary survival and
profitability. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first proposed prospect theory to argue that
the choices that individuals make in risky situations are not always consistent with the
basic assumptions and predictions of the most commonly accepted economic theory of
rational choice, namely the expected utility theory developed by Von Neumann and
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Morgenstern (1944). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that, contrary to expected
return theory’s principles, individuals are boundedly rational (Holmes, Bromiley, Devers,
Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011) rather than perfectly rational and thus don’t always make
perfectly rational decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) and that subjective
probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) and framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981,
1986) influence individuals’ decisions under risk. Moreover, they demonstrated that
individuals’ use of decision heuristics lead to biases that impact their decisions (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974).
They thus showed that how individuals interpret and frame their choices, as gains
or as losses, influences how much risk they will take. For instance, they found that
framing an investment decision as a loss (10% investment loss) will put someone in a
domain of loss, and framing the same investment decision as a gain (90% investment
profit) will put someone in a domain of gain. If an individual frames an outcome as a
loss, (s)he will assume more risk to avoid that outcome than if (s)he framed the identical
outcome as a gain. Therefore, prospect theory’s major insight is that people hate to lose
even more than they love to win and that this will systematically bias their attitudes
toward risk (Mercer, 2005).
Subsequent researchers extended prospect theory’s ideas from the individual level
to the firm level (for examples see: Bowman, 1982; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988;
Jegers, 1991). I extend these ideas even further to the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
level to explain the impact of risk orientation, a parent-subsidiary governance
mechanism, on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability.
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To govern their foreign subsidiaries, MNE parents can employ different MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms. In the following sections I explain
how MNE headquarters use the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms
of ownership, expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ to govern their foreign subsidiaries
and impact their foreign subsidiaries’ performance.

2.1. Ownership (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Mechanism)
and Performance
Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, and Certo (2010) note that “Firm ownership is an
increasingly influential form of corporate governance.” Judge (2011) suggests that
ownership plays a pivotal role in corporate governance. Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan
(2003a) edited a Special Research Forum on Governance through Ownership to further
research on ownership as a governance mechanism. Schaan (1983) shows that MNE
parents can influence and control their foreign subsidiaries through the use of several
control mechanisms. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) suggest that among the several used
foreign subsidiary control mechanisms, the level of an MNE parent’s ownership in its
foreign subsidiary is still generally considered one of the most important potential foreign
subsidiary control and influence mechanisms. Therefore, I consider an MNE parent’s
ownership in a foreign subsidiary as an important MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance mechanism.
Ownership generally refers to “the right to exclusive use of an asset. The owner of
an asset normally has the right to decide what use shall be made of it, and cannot be
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deprived of it except by law. The state, however, claims the right to regulate the use of
many assets, and to tax income derived from them” (Black, 1997, p. 340). In the MNE
context, ownership refers to the MNE parent’s exclusive rights to use its shares (assets) in
its foreign subsidiary. Two major ways MNE parents use their ownership in their foreign
subsidiaries are as a strategic governance mechanism (Alces, 2008; Doz & Prahalad,
1984; Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004) and a structural governance mechanism.
I argue that MNE parent ownership in a foreign subsidiary has a positive effect on
the survival of the foreign subsidiary but does not necessarily have an effect on the
profitability of the foreign subsidiary. That is because generally an MNE-parent
(principal) with higher ownership in a foreign subsidiary (agent) is expected to have more
incentive and influence, than a counterpart with lower ownership, to minimize parentsubsidiary agency costs and agency problems but may not necessarily be able to
maximize foreign subsidiary revenues. Minimizing agency costs and agency problems
consequently increases the survival likelihood but not necessarily the profitability of the
foreign subsidiary.
Classical corporate governance research suggests that concentrated owners, such
as institutional investors and large block holders, have more incentive and influence to
better monitor and govern their companies than their minority investor counterparts
(Chakraborty & Sheikh, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This is because first they have a
sufficiently larger investment at stake (Daily et al., 2003a) and second they cannot easily
divest their sufficiently larger investment in a firm not meeting their performance
expectations (Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998). Analogously, and for similar reasons,
generally an MNE parent with a higher ownership concentration in its foreign subsidiary
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is expected to have more incentive and influence to better monitor and govern its foreign
subsidiary than a counterpart with a lower ownership concentration in its foreign
subsidiary. However, having more incentive and influence to better govern its foreign
subsidiary due to higher ownership, by no means suggests that an MNE parent with lower
ownership in its foreign subsidiary cannot use other mechanisms to control its foreign
subsidiary (Schaan, 1988). Thus my statement is understandably general and exceptions
can be found.
Investors (stockowners) typically have two basic ways to improve firm
performance: exit and voice (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). MNEparents can also utilize these two ways to improve their foreign subsidiaries’
performance. For example, an MNE-parent can sell its shares (exit) in a certain
subsidiary to indicate its dissatisfaction with the subsidiary’s management or their
behavior. However, divesting a subsidiary is expensive because subsidiary shares are
usually not publicly traded and thus quite illiquid, which makes selling them costly.
Therefore, parents, with significant ownership in their subsidiaries, usually have more
incentive to exercise their voice. Investors, generally exercise their voice through
shareholder activism (Smith, 1996) by campaigning and voting in shareholder meetings.
MNE-parents, on the other hand, exercise voice through closely monitoring and directing
their foreign subsidiaries’ behavior. They exercise voice in at least three ways. The first is
through the voting of foreign subsidiary board members, many of whom are usually
MNE-parent managers, on the subsidiary’s strategies, budgets, and policies. The second
is through assigning expatriates, who are expected to be loyal to the MNE-parent, as
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foreign subsidiary general managers or top management team members. The third is
through setting policies and procedures for their foreign subsidiaries to follow.
I contend that an MNE-parent (principal) with higher ownership in a foreign
subsidiary (agent) typically has more influence on directing and monitoring the purpose,
goals, strategies, policies, and actions of the foreign subsidiary than a counterpart with
lower ownership. With such influence the parent can restructure the subsidiary’s business
activities or ownership or even change its charter (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) or
influence managerial behavior (Connelly et al., 2010). In the event of restructuring, the
parent can pursue financial, governance, operational, or ownership restructuring of the
subsidiary. When changing a subsidiary’s charter, a parent can alter a subsidiary’s
mandate (Roth & Morrison, 1992), responsibilities, business activities, markets served,
products manufactured, technologies held, functional areas covered, or any combination
thereof (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). While attempting to influence managerial behavior a
parent can persuade, lobby, or sometimes even force subsidiary managers to follow
certain courses of action. For instance, one of the participants interviewed for this study
was a subsidiary governance senior officer at the headquarters of an MNE. He suggested
that, at times, after making some acquisitions, the management of the MNE that he
worked at had to ‘politely’ force the management of the acquired subsidiary to follow the
acquirer’s policies and procedures.
With more incentive to monitor its foreign subsidiary than to divest it and with
more influence to monitor and direct the subsidiary’s behaviors, an MNE parent with
higher ownership is more likely to reduce a subsidiary’s moral hazard and to align a
subsidiary’s interests with the parent’s interests than would a counterpart with lower
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ownership. A lower foreign subsidiary moral hazard and a greater alignment of the
parent’s and the subsidiary’s interests will lower parent-subsidiary agency costs and
minimizes their agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; O’Donnell, 2000). Fama
and Jensen (1983b) argue that reducing agency problems significantly contributes to the
survival of different organizational forms. Similarly, I argue that minimizing parentsubsidiary agency problems considerably increases the survival likelihood of a subsidiary
(Jensen, 1983).
Greater MNE parent ownership in a foreign subsidiary is expected to increase the
survival of the foreign subsidiary, although this ownership-survival relationship is
anticipated to be nonlinear logarithmic. The latter is because, as parent ownership
increases and agency problems decrease, subsidiary self-serving behaviors decline.
However they decline at a decreasing rate, as increments in the ownership levels in the
lower end will have a larger impact in reducing potential for subsidiary self-serving
behavior, and thus agency costs, than similar ones at the higher end. Therefore I contend
that the law of diminishing marginal utility is at work here. For example, GomesCasseres (1990) notes that firms are likely to perceive a difference between 100 percent
and 80 percent foreign ownership differently from a difference between 80 percent and
60 percent foreign ownership. Applying the law of diminishing marginal utility, I argue
that increments at lower ownership levels (e.g. from 0% to 51%) are more sensitive than
similar increments at higher ownership levels (e.g. from 52% to 100%) (Dhanaraj &
Beamish, 2004).
Although I expect MNE parent ownership in a foreign subsidiary to have an effect
on the survival of the foreign subsidiary, I do not expect it to necessarily have an effect
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on the profitability of the foreign subsidiary for the following reasons. First, MNE parent
ownership in a foreign subsidiary is expected to minimize MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
agency costs and agency problems that are in turn expected to increase foreign subsidiary
survival. However, ownership is not expected to maximize foreign subsidiary revenues,
which are essential for increasing foreign subsidiary profitability. That is because in
classical corporate governance, investors typically do not manage the day-to-day affairs
of their firms, but elect directors who appoint top managers to do so. However, investors
usually interfere when their firm is facing a crisis or possible bankruptcy, which
sometimes may be the result of agency problems, but they generally do not interfere to
maximize their firm’s revenues, they let the board and management do this job (Lane et
al., 1998).
Second, a firm’s profitability is determined by its interaction with its product
markets and its many factor markets, of which the capital markets are but one (Lane et
al., 1998). Similarly, a foreign subsidiary’s profitability is determined by all these
variables, of which its ownership structure is but one. Third, there is some evidence that
ownership concentration and accounting measures of performance are independent
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) which suggests that foreign subsidiary ownership and
profitability (financial performance) would probably be independent as well. Therefore I
hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1a: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary has a positive
nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign subsidiary’s survival.
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Hypothesis 1b: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary has a
negligible effect on that foreign subsidiary’s profitability.

2.2. Expatriates (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Mechanism)
and Performance
I previously defined MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance as the system
that directs and monitors the relationships between foreign subsidiaries and their
stakeholders, among which the MNE parent is typically a major stakeholder. I view
expatriates as an important MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanism.
Many studies see expatriates as a key MNE parent-foreign subsidiary control mechanism
(Edström & Galbraith, 1977; Fenwick, De Cieri, & Welch, 1999; Gong, 2003). MacedoSoares and Schubsky (2010) explicitly view expatriates as an effective MNE parentforeign subsidiary governance mechanism. Consistent with Macedo-Soares and
Schubsky (2010) I consider expatriates as an MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
mechanism. That is because I view control as analogous to only the monitoring
dimension in my MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance definition whereas I view
expatriates as also having an MNE parent-foreign subsidiary alignment role analogous to
the directing dimension in my definition. Monitoring is defined as observation of an
agent’s effort or outcomes that is accomplished through supervision, accounting controls,
and other devices. Whereas, one way alignment of an agent’s and a principal’s interests
can be achieved is through contracts that make the agent’s compensation contingent on
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outcomes of his or her performance that are desired by the principal (Tosi, Katz, &
Gomez-Mejia, 1997).
Moreover, given that most foreign subsidiaries either do not have a board of
directors or have an inactive symbolic one (Gillies & Dickinson, 1999), I expect
expatriates to either be on the subsidiary’s board, when it exists, or significantly
substitute for the subsidiary’s board, when it does not exist, and have a parent-subsidiary
governance role in addition to their subsidiary management role. Thus, in this study, I
broaden the role of expatriates from just being subsidiary managers to having a role as
parent-subsidiary governors.
As foreign subsidiary governors, and similar to most domestic companies’ board
members, expatriates are expected to have conformance (monitoring) and performance
(directing) roles. The conformance role includes an internal role, namely monitoring
management, and an external role, namely being accountable to stakeholders. The
performance role includes a short-term-oriented role, namely policymaking, and a longterm-oriented role, namely strategy formulation (Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011; Tricker,
2012).
Expatriates are employees coming from an MNE’s headquarters or other entities
and working in a foreign-country subsidiary of that MNE. Expatriates typically function
as operational governance mechanisms and social governance mechanisms for their
parents (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; Boyacigiller, 1990; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000).
Headquarter-subsidiary research shows that as subsidiary control increases,
headquarters use of expatriates as a parent supervision mechanism increases (O’Donnell,
2000). Therefore, I contend that subsidiaries with more expatriates are expected to be
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better monitored and governed, thus minimizing parent-subsidiary agency costs and
agency problems and consequently increasing their survival likelihood.
I argue that the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a positive
nonlinear logarithmic effect on the survival of the foreign subsidiary but does not
necessarily have an effect on the profitability of the foreign subsidiary. That is because
generally an MNE parent (principal) with more expatriates in a foreign subsidiary (agent)
is expected to have more influence, than a counterpart with fewer expatriates, to
minimize parent-subsidiary agency costs and agency problems. However, the MNE
parent may not necessarily be able to maximize foreign subsidiary revenues or cover the
costs of the generally more expensive expatriates versus local managers. Minimizing
agency costs and problems consequently increases the survival likelihood but not
necessarily the profitability of the foreign subsidiary.
In this study I theorize the number of expatriates, and not the percentage of
expatriates, in the foreign subsidiary, as the antecedent to the subsidiary’s survival, for
the following two reasons. First, from a governance perspective, a small number of
expatriates, although it may not be a big percentage of expatriates, in the foreign
subsidiary, may be enough for the parent to govern the foreign subsidiary. Second, also
from a governance perspective, the governance impact of one expatriate in a smaller
subsidiary may be similar to his/her impact in a bigger subsidiary, although the expatriate
percentage in these two subsidiaries may be significantly different. These two cases are
particularly applicable when the expatriate(s) include key top managers such as the CEO,
CFO, etc. and when these expatriates are fully supported by the MNE parent; two
conditions that can be applicable in many foreign subsidiaries.
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MNE parent-foreign subsidiary relationships are similar to principal-agent
relationships (Tan & Mahoney, 2006) since, the same way a principal delegates decision
making authority to its agent, an MNE parent delegates decision making authority to its
foreign subsidiary (O’Donnell, 2000). However, parent-subsidiary relationships have
more pronounced information asymmetry between the parent and the subsidiary than the
information asymmetry present between traditional domestic principals and agents. This
higher level of information asymmetry arises from the different kinds of distances
(physical, political, legal, etc.) between the headquarters and the subsidiary.
Parent-subsidiary distance and information asymmetry increase moral hazard and
adverse selection (Shapiro, 2005). They increase moral hazard because they make it more
difficult and costly for the parent to observe and/or monitor the subsidiary’s actions. They
increase adverse selection because they make it more difficult and costly for the parent to
evaluate whether the subsidiary’s actions are in the parent’s best interests (Eisenhardt,
1989).
Agency theory suggests that boards are motivated to monitor management and
align management’s interests with those of owners primarily through two board
incentives, namely board independence and director compensation. It argues that
independent

outside

directors

(directors

who

are

not

current

or

former

managers/employees of the firm) have a greater incentive to monitor management
because they are not socially or economically related to management. It also argues that
the interests of directors with equity compensation will be more aligned with those of
shareholders and thus will have a greater incentive to monitor the performance of
management and direct them to pursue shareholder interests (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
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In a similar manner, the interests of expatriates, who are usually on the payroll of
the MNE-parent, will be aligned with the interests of the parent (Bonache & Fernández,
1997). Thus expatriates are expected to be and tend to be committed to the MNE-parent
as a whole (as well as to the subsidiary) and therefore are deemed trustworthy parent
representatives in ‘distant’ foreign subsidiaries (Gong, 2003). Thus they are considered
extended forms of headquarters-subsidiary control or monitoring (Boyacigiller, 1990)
and alignment (Tan & Mahoney, 2006).
Expatriates socially align or direct the parent’s and subsidiary’s interests, goals,
actions, and outcomes in a way that is beneficial for both the subsidiary and parent by
continually communicating and negotiating strategy and performance between the parent
and subsidiary (Macedo-Soares & Schubsky, 2010). Moreover, they socially or culturally
control or monitor a subsidiary’s goals, actions, and outcomes to fit with those set for it
by the parent by sharing and inculcating the parent’s values and norms with the
subsidiary’s managers and employees (Ouchi, 1979).
Expatriates monitor foreign subsidiaries’ strategy implementation, successor
training, and evaluating and rewarding the TMT (Moore, 2006; Rindova, 1999; Selmer &
Luk, 1995). They also align these activities with the MNE-parent’s expectations by
scrutinizing, evaluating, and regulating the actions of TMT members to meet the
expectations of the MNE-parent, thus lowering moral hazard and adverse selection.
Lower foreign subsidiary moral hazard and adverse selection and greater
alignment of the parent’s and the subsidiary’s interests lowers parent-subsidiary agency
costs and minimizes their agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; O’Donnell, 2000).
Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that reducing agency problems significantly contributes
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to the survival of different organizational forms. Similarly, I argue that minimizing
parent-subsidiary agency problems considerably increases the survival likelihood of a
subsidiary (Jensen, 1983).
Although the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is expected to increase
the survival of the foreign subsidiary, this expatriate-survival relationship is anticipated to
be nonlinear logarithmic. That occurs because, as the number of expatriates increases and
agency costs and problems decrease, subsidiary self-serving behaviors decline.
However self-serving behaviors decline at a decreasing rate with each additional
expatriate, since the marginal benefit from expatriate governance gradually decelerates
(Harzing, 2002). That is because the marginal control benefits, such as direct surveillance
of foreign subsidiaries by MNE parent managers, instilling parent’s values and goals in
the subsidiary, and weaving informal communication networks between parent and
subsidiary and among subsidiaries (Harzing, 2002), reaped from an additional expatriate,
gradually decrease.
Therefore, I argue that increments at lower expatriate numbers (e.g. from 0 to 5)
are more profound than similar increments at higher expatriate numbers (e.g. over 6). My
logic is that, at the higher end, the total expatriate costs may become significantly more
than the total agency costs saved by the assignment of these expatriates (Collings,
Scullion, & Morley, 2007). This in turn may induce MNE parents to replace additional
expatriates by other control alternatives, such as international training programs,
meetings, and task forces, that may serve the same control purpose at a lower cost
(Harzing, 2002).
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Although I expect the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary to have an
effect on the survival of the foreign subsidiary, for the following reasons I do not expect
it to necessarily have an effect on the profitability of the foreign subsidiary. First, the
number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is expected to minimize MNE parentforeign subsidiary agency problems that are in turn expected to increase foreign
subsidiary survival. However, expatriates are not expected to maximize foreign
subsidiary revenues due to their lower host country legitimacy (Schotter & Beamish,
2011a) and reduced understanding of the local market (e.g. local customers, suppliers,
and competitors), local culture, local language, etc. compared to their local counterparts
(Widmier, Brouthers, & Beamish, 2008). Lower revenues would lead to lower
profitability or at best unimproved profitability.
Second, while expatriates may improve control, coordination, and knowledge
transfer (Widmier et al., 2008), due to their lower host country legitimacy, they increase
operating costs incurred in effectively managing the local workforce (Gaur, Delios, &
Singh, 2007). Third, in many cases expatriate costs may outweigh their financial benefits.
For example, it is generally estimated that the cost associated with an international
assignment is between three and five times an assignee’s home salary per year, let alone a
corresponding local’s salary (Selmer, 2001). Moreover, expatriate managers’ failure rates
range from a low of 3 percent to as high as 70 percent with the estimated cost of a failed
expatriate assignment to be as high as $1,000,000 (Crocitto, Sullivan, & Carraher, 2005).
Furthermore, the benefits of expatriate assignments are not very clear and only few
companies measure expatriate return on investment (ROI) (Collings et al., 2007).
Therefore I hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis 2a: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a positive
nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign subsidiary’s survival.

Hypothesis 2b: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a negligible
effect on its profitability.

2.3. Risk Orientation (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance
Mechanism) and Performance
At the public sector level, the term ‘risk governance’ refers to the ‘various ways
in which many actors, individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal with [public
or societal] risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt &
Renn, 2011). I define risk governance at the business sector level, as the ways in which
corporate boards in general, and MNE boards in particular, oversee corporate risks
surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity. Within the risk and governance
literatures I thus expand the use of the term ‘risk governance’ beyond the public sector to
the business sector.
It is important to note that corporate risk governance and corporate risk
management are not the same. Risk management refers to “the culture, processes and
structures that are directed towards taking advantage of potential opportunities while
managing potential adverse effects (ASXCGC, 2006: 31).” The Chief Risk Officer
(CRO) is usually the highest corporate manager responsible for risk management.
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Risk governance refers to the board “ascertaining, to a reasonable degree, that the
executive team has identified and assessed critical risks and has appropriate risk
mitigation and management in place that are designed to address the risks that the
organization faces (Errity & Ristuccia, 2012: 1).” The Risk Governance Committee is
usually the board-level committee responsible for governing/overseeing company risks. If
there is no risk governance committee, the full board holds this responsibility. To
highlight the importance of risk governance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) issued Proxy Disclosure Enhancements rules in December 2009,
which were effective in February 2010. These rules require disclosure of the board’s role
with regard to risk oversight in the company’s annual proxy statement. The board’s risk
oversight activities include overseeing the risk management infrastructure, addressing
risk and strategy simultaneously, assisting with risk appetite and tolerance, monitoring
risks, overseeing risk exposure, overseeing and supporting the CRO, and consulting
external risk experts (Errity & Ristuccia, 2012).
Risk governance is increasingly expected and required from boards of directors.
This is evident from the clear trend by capital market regulators and stock exchanges
around the world, since the early 2000s, to recommend to, or require, corporations to
improve their internal risk management practices (Brown, Steen, & Foreman, 2009;
Errity & Ristuccia, 2012; Kleffner, Lee, & McGannon, 2003; Sobel & Reding, 2004).
To govern their risks, MNEs explicitly or implicitly follow one of three risk
orientations. I define risk orientation (Pan & Tse, 2000) as an organization’s degree of
comfort when facing uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous gains or losses (Ehrlich &
Maestas, 2010; van Asselt & Renn, 2011). I describe MNEs as endorsing one of the
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following three risk orientations: extreme risk-averting orientation, moderate risk-taking
orientation, or excessive risk-seeking orientation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wiseman
& Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
I adopt the view that generally subsidiaries’ and parents’ risk orientations are
similar. This may contradict agency theory’s belief that principals’ (parents) and agents’
(subsidiaries) risk profiles are different, namely that agents are risk-averse whereas
principals are risk-neutral (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). However, Lane, Cannella, &
Lubatkin (1998) found some evidence to suggest that the risk profiles of principals and
agents are more similar than different. Moreover, anecdotal evidence collected from the
interviews I conducted with subsidiary general managers showed that almost all MNEs
had formal risk compliance policies/guidelines/systems and that their subsidiaries
typically complied with these risk policies. However, this is not to say that these
guidelines do not provide subsidiaries with some risk discretion when making their
decisions. Therefore, this section’s following arguments are built on the assumption that
generally subsidiaries’ and parents’ risk orientations are similar.
I argue that an MNE parent’s risk has a nonlinear, declining, s-shaped effect on its
foreign subsidiary’s survival (see Figure 2.1). Accordingly, I argue that a subsidiary of a
parent with an extreme risk-averting orientation is more likely to survive than a
counterpart of a parent with a moderate risk-taking orientation, which in turn is more
likely to survive than a counterpart of a parent with an excessive risk-seeking orientation.
Furthermore, I contend that different subsidiaries within the same risk orientation
have different survival likelihoods. Specifically, for subsidiaries of parents who are
moderate risk-takers and who thus formally or informally encourage their subsidiaries to
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be moderate risk-takers as well, the higher their risk level compared to their industry
peers, the higher their survival likelihood. In contrast, for subsidiaries of parents who are
either extreme risk-averters or excessive risk-seekers and who thus formally or
informally encourage their subsidiaries to be correspondingly extreme risk-averters or
excessive risk-seekers as well, the higher their risk level compared to their industry peers,
the lower their survival likelihood.
To develop these arguments further, I first clarify what is meant by a rational
actor and a boundedly rational actor. Kahneman (2003) describes a rational actor as
someone endowed with a cognitive system that has the logical ability of sound reasoning
and the low computing costs of fast intuition. He adds “Reasoning is done deliberately
and effortfully, but intuitive thoughts seem to come spontaneously to mind, without
conscious search or computation, and without effort (Kahneman, 2003: 1450). The
operations of [intuition] are fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally
charged; they are also governed by habit, and are therefore difficult to control or modify.
The operations of [reasoning] are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled;
they are also relatively flexible and potentially rule-governed. The difference in effort
provides the most useful indications of whether a given mental process should be
assigned to [intuition] or [reasoning] (Kahneman, 2003: 1451).” In contrast, a boundedly
rational actor relies more on intuition than on reasoning and his/her behavior is not
guided by what he/she is able to compute, but by what he/she happens to see at a given
moment. He/she often processes information in a superficial manner and represents
categories by prototypes. Given his heavier reliance on intuition, a boundedly rational
actor is more prone to biases and errors in thinking (Kahneman, 2003).
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For subsidiaries encouraged to be moderate risk-takers, I argue that the higher
their risk level compared to their moderate risk-taking industry peers, the higher their
survival likelihood. That is because moderate risk-taking subsidiaries are considered to be
rational risk-takers since they neither extremely avoid risks nor excessively seek risks but
take risks in a moderate manner. Prospect theory suggests that they rationally calculate
the prospects of the outcomes of their risky choices then wisely choose to take risks that
are more likely to benefit them than to harm them. Moreover, it suggests that taking risks
in a rational manner allows the subsidiary to make more optimal decisions that increase
its competitiveness and thus its survival likelihood (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).
For subsidiaries encouraged to be extreme risk-averters or excessive risk-seekers I
argue that the higher their risk level compared to their industry peers, the lower their
survival likelihood. That is because extreme risk-averters are considered to be boundedly
rational actors since their judgment is biased. Prospect theory suggests that their
judgment is biased because they intuitively misjudge the prospects of the outcomes of
their risky choices by overestimating the likelihood of loss. Consequently, they
erroneously avoid risks that could have benefited them if they had taken them. Avoiding
risks in an unintendedly biased manner leads the subsidiary to make more suboptimal
decisions that decrease its competitiveness and thus its survival likelihood (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986).
Relatedly, a similar argument holds for excessive risk-seekers because they are
considered to be boundedly rational actors since their judgment is biased. Prospect theory
suggests that their judgment is biased because they intuitively misjudge the prospects of
the outcomes of their risky choices by overestimating the likelihood of gain.
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Consequently, they erroneously seek risks that ultimately harm them. Seeking risks in an
unintendedly biased manner leads the subsidiary to make more suboptimal decisions that
decrease its competitiveness and thus its survival likelihood (Tversky & Kahneman,
1986).
Although I expect an MNE parent’s risk to have an effect on its foreign
subsidiary’s survival, I do not expect it to necessarily have an effect on its foreign
subsidiary’s profitability for the following reasons. First, the empirical evidence
measured over the past 50 to 75 years regarding the risk-return relationship is mixed or
weak at best (Lundblad, 2007). For example, mainstream finance theory, namely the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and
Mossin (1966) predicts a positive relationship between risk and return. More recent
research still supports this prediction (e.g. Bansal and Lundblad (2002), Ghysels, SantaClara, and Valkanov (2005), etc.). However, an important and rich strategy research
stream, developed by Bowman (1980, 1982, 1984), known as Bowman’s Paradox,
predicts a negative relationship between risk and return. More recent research still
supports this prediction as well (e.g. Andersen, Denrell, and Bettis (2007), Deephouse
and Wiseman (2000), etc.). Moreover, a third stream of research shows that there is no
significant relationship between risk and return (e.g. Fletcher (2000), Fama and French
(1992), Strong and Xu (1997)).
Second, this relationship seems to depend on many different factors including
data used (Bali & Peng, 2006), statistical techniques used (Ghysels et al., 2005) measures
used (Baucus, Golec, & Cooper, 1993; McNamara & Bromiley, 1999), market conditions
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(e.g. whether it is an up market or a down market) (Fletcher, 2000), seasonality of risk
premia (Corhay, Hawawini, & Michel, 1987), etc. Therefore I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between parent risk orientation and foreign
subsidiary survival is nonlinear (declining s-shaped), with the slope negative for parents
with an extremely risk-averse orientation, positive for parents with a moderate risktaking orientation, and negative for parents with an excessively risk-seeking orientation
(see Figure 2.1).

Hypothesis 3b: An MNE parent’s risk orientation has a negligible effect on its
foreign subsidiary’s profitability.
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Figure 2.1 Relationship between Risk Orientation (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary
Governance Mechanism) and Subsidiary Survival
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2.4. Regional Headquarters (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance
Mechanism) and Performance
A regional headquarters (RHQ) is a subsidiary or an office that has control over
the operation of one or more other offices and subsidiaries in other economies or
countries in the region (Enright, 2005b). It adds value by linking the activities of
corporate headquarters with the activities of the subsidiaries within its region (Enright,
2005a). A RHQ may perform various activities such as corporate governance,
management, and strategy activities as well as aggregated scale-sensitive functional and
support activities (Enright, 2005b). An RHQ may have an administrative charter, an
entrepreneurial charter, or both (Mahnke, Ambos, Nell, & Hobdari, 2012). In this thesis I
focus on the RHQs’ corporate governance activity which is considered part of an RHQ
administrative charter. That is, I focus on a RHQ role in governing its parent’s foreign
subsidiaries that are operating in the countries within its region. As an intermediate
subsidiary governance mechanism, some of the corporate governance sub-activities that a
RHQ performs include: coordination of other operations within region, monitoring of
other regional operations, reporting regional activities to parent company, regional liaison
center for parent company, and regional strategy formulation (Enright, 2005b).
A RHQ functions as an intermediate subsidiary governance mechanism because it
acts as a mediating hierarch (Blair & Stout, 2001; Lan & Heracleous, 2010) between its
corporate HQ and its HQs’ foreign subsidiaries operating in the countries within the
RHQs’ region. As a mediating hierarch it mediates the tension between its corporate
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HQs’ call for global integration / efficiency and its local subsidiaries’ push for national
effectiveness / responsiveness (Bartlett & Beamish, 2014; Doz & Prahalad, 1984).
From an agency theory perspective, as a governance mechanism, a RHQ
simultaneously acts as an agent to its MNE parent and as a principal to its parent’s
foreign subsidiaries operating within its region. I argue that having a RHQ improves the
MNE-parent’s governance of the subsidiaries operating within the RHQ’s region by
reducing parent-subsidiary agency problems. This, in turn, improves the survival
likelihood of these foreign subsidiaries.
One major reason why an MNE-parent establishes a RHQ is to better govern a
group of foreign subsidiaries in a geographically, economically, legally, politically, etc.
distant region by reducing the agency problems between the MNE-parent and those
distant subsidiaries. Establishing a RHQ improves the communication process between
the MNE-parent and its ‘distant’ foreign subsidiaries affiliated with the established RHQ.
Geographically distant subsidiaries may be in time zones that are different from that of
the MNE-parent. Economically distant subsidiaries may be in markets with economic
environments / characteristics that are different from those of the MNE-parent’s market.
Legally distant subsidiaries may be in countries with laws and regulations that are
different from those of the MNE-parent’s country. Politically distant subsidiaries may be
in countries with political environments / systems that are different from those of the
MNE parent’s country (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010).
The establishment of a RHQ improves the communication between MNE parent
and its foreign subsidiaries affiliated with the RHQ because the RHQ understands and
bridges the parent’s characteristics and environments and the subsidiaries’ characteristics
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and environments.

For example a RHQ understands both the parent’s strategy and

expectations for the region and the subsidiaries’ geographical, economic, legal, and
political operating environments in that region. This gives the RHQ the capability to
facilitate the information flow and information interpretation between the MNE parent
and its corresponding regional subsidiaries. This also gives the RHQ the ability to
provide operational and context-specific subsidiary information to global HQ,
information that is essential for global HQ to govern its foreign subsidiaries (Ciabuschi,
Dellestrand, & Holm, 2012). Moreover, this gives the RHQ the ability to monitor several
subsidiaries (agents) on behalf of the global HQ which reduces the number of agents the
global HQ needs to monitor directly (Alfoldi, Clegg, & McGaughey, 2012). As a result,
this helps the RHQ reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard and improve the
interests, goals, and outcomes alignment between the parent and its subsidiaries operating
in the region.
This, in turn, decreases the agency problems between the MNE-parent and the
subsidiaries in the region. It also decreases the agency costs that may result from
subsidiaries’ (agents’) pursuing their self-interest at the expense of parent (principal)
interests (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). By decreasing parent-subsidiary agency problems
and agency costs, the RHQ helps both its subsidiaries and ultimately its parent increase
their survival likelihoods (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).
Although I expect foreign subsidiaries governed by RHQ to have a higher
survival likelihood than their counterparts not governed by RHQ, I do not expect them to
necessarily be more profitable than these counterparts for the following reason. A RHQ
acts as an additional hierarchical level in an organization’s structure. It increases an
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organization’s vertical complexity (the number of levels in the hierarchy of an
organization) (Carillo & Kopelman, 1991). The literature suggests that the impact of
vertical complexity on performance is mixed at best (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Handel,
2014). Bureaucratic theorists such as Blau (1972; Blau & Meyer, 1987) from sociology,
Chandler (1977; 1990) from business, and Williamson (1985; 1975) from economics
argue that bureaucracies are efficient forms of organization. Whereas, post-bureaucratic
and neo-liberal organization theories argue that leaner organizations perform better than
bureaucratic ones (e.g. Carillo and Kopelman (1991), Love and Nohria (2005), etc.).
Therefore, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 4a: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional headquarters
(RHQs) in the regions where these foreign subsidiaries operate are more likely to survive
than their counterparts of parents without RHQs in the regions where they operate.

Hypothesis 4b: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional headquarters
(RHQs) in the regions where these foreign subsidiaries operate do not necessarily
financially perform better than their counterparts of parents without RHQs in the regions
where they operate.

2.5. Expatriates Moderate the Effect of Ownership on Survival
Previous sections that developed the ownership-performance and expatriatesperformance hypotheses suggested that MNE parents use their ownership in their foreign
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subsidiaries as a strategic governance mechanism (Alces, 2008; Doz & Prahalad, 1984;
Xu et al., 2004); and use the expatriates they send to their foreign subsidiaries as social,
cultural, and / or operational governance mechanisms (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998;
Boyacigiller, 1990; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000). They use these mechanisms to reduce
MNE parent (principal)-foreign subsidiary (agent) agency problems and thus increase the
survival of their foreign subsidiaries. This section argues that expatriates complement /
substitute for MNE parent ownership and thus moderate the effect of MNE parent
ownership on foreign subsidiary survival.
In classical domestic corporate governance, shareowners govern management’s
behaviors through several ways that include the following: Monitoring their company’s
stock price through the stock market and buying and selling their company’s stocks as a
signal to management of their (i.e. shareholders) satisfaction / dissatisfaction with their
company’s governance and performance; Electing nonexecutive directors to represent
them on boards and thus indirectly shape the strategic decisions, direction, and outcomes
of their company according to their (i.e. shareowners) best interests; Communicating and
negotiating directly with management about their (i.e. stockowners) preferences; Voting
on important decisions during company general meetings; Formally submitting
shareholder proxy proposals to companies; Using the media to alert other investors to
their company’s problems and their (i.e. shareholders) proxy proposals (Gillan & Starks,
2000, 2007).
In MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance, among the above mentioned ways,
parents may be limited to using the following methods to govern their foreign
subsidiaries: Directly negotiating with the foreign subsidiary’s management; Appointing
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subsidiary board directors who come from the MNE parent to align the subsidiary’s
interests with the parent’s interests; Voting on important foreign subsidiary-related
decisions during company meetings (Konopaske, Werner, & Neupert, 2002). In addition,
they may provide training, services, and resources and send expatriates to their
subsidiaries to govern these foreign subsidiaries (Schaan, 1988).
Therefore, in MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance, parents may use
expatriates as social, cultural, and / or operational governance mechanisms together with
ownership to govern their foreign subsidiaries. As social and cultural governance
mechanisms, expatriates work on aligning the values, practices, and informal
communications as well as the mission, vision, and objectives, of the subsidiary with
those of its parent. They perform these functions so that the culture and social behavior of
the subsidiary and its employees are consistent with those of its parent (Fenwick et al.,
1999; Harzing, 2002). As operational governance mechanisms, expatriates monitor and
(dis)approve of subsidiary activities such as production, R&D, marketing, and finance
activities and align these activities so that the operational behavior of the subsidiary is
consistent with the formal policies and informal expectations of its parent (Torbiörn,
1994; Xu et al., 2004).
Moreover, ownership is an ex ante MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
mechanism during international expansions while expatriates are an ex post MNE parentforeign subsidiary governance mechanism during international operations (Konopaske et
al., 2002). Therefore, ownership is considered to be an ex ante strategic governance
mechanism while expatriates are considered to be an ex post social, cultural, and / or
operational governance mechanism. Despite this, from looking at the way these two
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governance mechanisms are used by shareowners, one can see that their uses overlap in
several ways and that they may complement and / or substitute for each other (Chung &
Beamish, 2005; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Harzing, 2002; Konopaske et al., 2002;
Schaan, 1988) in reducing MNE parent-foreign subsidiary agency problems and thus
increasing foreign subsidiary survival. Therefore I argue that expatriates moderate the
effect of ownership on subsidiary survival, such that this effect is stronger when the
number of expatriates is lower and weaker when the number of expatriates is higher.
Given the above mentioned ways MNE parents use ownership and expatriates to
govern their foreign subsidiaries, one can argue that the effect of increasing parent
ownership on subsidiary survival will be higher when the number of expatriates in the
subsidiary is lower than when the number of expatriates in the subsidiary is higher. That
is because, when the number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is higher, expatriates
as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism are expected to almost completely
substitute for ownership as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism, since the greater
number of expatriates is expected to completely substitute for an owner’s efforts to
monitor and align the behavior of the subsidiary with its (i.e. owner’s / parent’s)
expectations. Whereas, when the number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is lower,
expatriates as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism are expected to only
complement ownership as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism, since the fewer
number of expatriates are expected to only complement an owner’s efforts to monitor and
align the behavior of the subsidiary with its (i.e. owner’s / parent’s) expectations.
For example, when the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is high, it
would be expected that they will be governing the subsidiary’s culture as well as its
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operations. That is, they will be working on aligning the subsidiary’s values, mission,
vision, and objectives as well as its various activities (e.g. production, R&D, marketing,
finance, etc.). This would replace the MNE parent’s efforts to govern the foreign
subsidiary through a subsidiary board or through voting on important subsidiary-related
decisions in company meetings or through providing training, services, and / or resources
to the subsidiary from a distant. Consequently, this would reduce the effect of a higher
level of MNE parent ownership on a foreign subsidiary’s survival.
Whereas, when the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is low, it would
be expected that their influence will be lower than when that number is high and thus
they may be governing only the subsidiary’s culture or operations or neither. Thus their
presence in the subsidiary would not replace the MNE parent’s efforts to govern the
subsidiary through the parent’s own, generally more distant, governance mechanisms but
would probably complement these efforts. Consequently, this would increase the effect of
a higher level of MNE parent ownership on a foreign subsidiary’s survival. Therefore I
hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 5: Expatriates modify the effect of ownership on foreign subsidiary
survival; the effect of MNE parent ownership on foreign subsidiary survival is stronger
(weaker) when the number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is lower (higher).
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CHAPTER 3
3. PILOT CANADIAN STUDY: METHODS AND RESULTS

3.1. Methods
Following recent calls for methodological advancements in international business
research (Punnett & Shenkar, 2004; Scandura & Williams, 2000; Schotter & Beamish,
2013), I used a multi-method (i.e. quantitative and qualitative) approach. First, I
conducted a pilot quantitative survival analysis to investigate how Japanese MNE parents
governed their Canadian subsidiaries which were more likely to survive, compared to
Canadian subsidiaries that were less likely to survive. Second, after quantitatively
confirming that better surviving Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs are generally
governed through higher parent ownership ratios, higher numbers of expatriates, and
lower levels of risk, I conducted ten interviews (McCracken, 1988), each around one hour
in length, with Canadian subsidiary CEOs, board members, or top management team
(TMT) members, mostly of Japanese MNE parents, to better understand why these better
surviving Canadian subsidiaries are governed that way by their Japanese MNE parents. I
combined quantitative and qualitative methods to ensure higher levels of relevance and
validity (Jick, 1979). Following Bruning, Sonpar, and Wang (2012), and Bresman,
Birkinshaw, and Nobel (1999) I (1) describe my methods in two sections, quantitative
and qualitative approaches, and (2) present my statistical findings in a quantitative results
section and my interview findings in a qualitative results section.
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3.1.1.
3.1.1.1.

Quantitative Approach
Sample and Data
This pilot study tested my theory on a sample of Canadian subsidiaries of

Japanese parent MNEs. These companies were identified from several editions of Kaigai
Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran, Kuni-Betsu (Japanese Overseas Investments, by Country),
published by Toyo Keizai (referred to as the TK dataset hereafter). The TK dataset
provides subsidiary-level data on the overseas activities of Japanese MNEs.
A Canadian-Japanese sample was appropriate for several reasons. First, Japanese
inward FDI stock into Canada amounted to approximately $16 billion in 2010, an
increase of 11 percent from 2009, and Japan is the leading Asian foreign direct investor
in Canada followed by China (Canada, 2012). Second, the Canadian-Japanese sample
provided Canadian subsidiary-level governance data which could also be matched with
Japanese parent-level governance data. Third, additional data on Canadian subsidiaries of
Japanese MNEs could be found in the Dun & Bradstreet Canadian Key Business
Directories for all the years of the sample. Fourth, the extensive time distribution in the
dataset offered considerable variance in the survival-vs.-exit outcomes of the Canadian
subsidiaries.
Additional Canadian subsidiary-level data were hand-coded from the 1991-2009
editions of the Dun & Bradstreet Canadian Key Business Directory to complement the
TK’s subsidiary-level data. Japanese MNE parent-level data were drawn from the Nikkei
Economic Electronic Databank of Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. (NEEDS) and matched
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with parent MNE names in the TK data. Country-level data were collected from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

3.1.1.2.

Variables

Dependent Variable (DV)
Subsidiary Exit: Following previous studies on subsidiary survival (Dai, Eden, &
Beamish, 2013), this study’s dependent variable Subsidiary Exit is an indicator variable,
SubsidiaryExit, that takes a value of 1 if subsidiary x exits at time t, and 0 if it remains
(survives). Observations start in 1990, and continue until an exit occurs, or they are rightcensored in 2008. I follow Delios and Beamish (2001) in treating delisted subsidiaries
from the sample as exits, because the TK dataset is almost exhaustive for all cases of
Japanese FDI. This approach has been validated by another study by Delios and Beamish
(2004) in which they compared identified cases of exit in the TK dataset with reported
cases of exit. For the period 1990–2008 there were 69 identified exits out of 196
Canadian subsidiaries of 142 Japanese parent MNEs and a total of 1,621 observations.
Independent Variables (IVs)
Ownership Ratio: consistent with previous research ownership ratio is measured
as the logarithm of the percentage of the focal subsidiary’s equity owned by the largest
Japanese owner. The largest Japanese owner is used because typically it is considered the
Japanese parent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004).
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Expatriate Number: consistent with previous research (Chung & Beamish,
2005; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Plourde, Parker, & Schaan, 2013) I measure expatriate
number as the logarithm of the number of expatriates in the subsidiary.
Risk Orientation: I measured risk orientation as the Japanese parent’s sectoradjusted debt ratio. To calculate this measure I first calculated the Japanese parent’s debt
ratio (i.e. total liabilities divided by total assets). Second, I calculated the average debt
ratio for each sector of the three sectors: Manufacturing, Trade, and Services & Others
(see next page for a detailed description of sector) by adding the debt ratios of all the
Japanese parents in a sector and dividing their total by the number of parents in that
sector. Finally, I divided each Japanese parent’s debt ratio by its sector’s debt ratio to get
each firm’s sector-adjusted debt ratio. I also squared and cubed the sector-adjusted debt
ratio to test the nonlinear s-shaped relationship between risk orientation and survival
likelihood that I hypothesized.
Using a firm’s sector-adjusted debt ratio as a proxy to measure its risk orientation
is appropriate for several reasons. First, firm debt ratios have been used in the literature to
measure firm risk (Abor, 2007; Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970; Berger, Ofek, &
Yermack, 1997; Friend & Lang, 1988; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wen, Rwegasira, &
Bilderbeek, 2002). Second, among the other used debt ratio measures, the debt ratio
measure that I used (i.e. the total liability divided by total assets measure) has been
shown to exhibit the highest association with risk (Beaver, 1966). Third, this pilot study’s
sample consists of Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs and sector appears to
influence governance mechanisms in general (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001) and
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corporate debt ratios in Japan in particular (Remmers, Stonehill, Wright, & Beekhuisen,
1974).
Control Variables
I controlled for several variables that the literature suggests may be possible
alternative explanations for subsidiary survival and that could consequently confound my
results. First, at the subsidiary level, I controlled for the following variables.
Subsidiary age: consistent with (Dai et al., 2013) I controlled for subsidiary age to
account for (1) the possible effect of the liability of newness and (2) the possible effect of
the ability of older subsidiaries to adapt to host-country conditions, on subsidiary
survival. I measured subsidiary age as the logarithm of the number of years a subsidiary
has operated since its date of establishment in the host country.
Subsidiary Size: I controlled for subsidiary size to account for liabilities of
smallness and structural inertia since previous studies have shown a positive relationship
between the size and survival of foreign subsidiaries (Li, 1995). I measured subsidiary
size as the logarithm of the total number of subsidiary employees.
Subsidiary sector: I controlled for subsidiary sector. Given that my Canadian
subsidiaries’ sample was a relatively small sample I grouped all the industries into 3
broad sectors (manufacturing = 1, trade = 2, and services & others =3) to keep the
number of variables in my model at a statistically acceptable level.
Second, at the parent level, consistent with Kim, Lu, and Rhee (2012) I controlled
for Parent Performance and Parent Size since these variables are known to usually affect
subsidiary survival (Delios & Beamish, 2001). I measured parent performance as the

57

return on assets of the parent and measured parent size as the logarithm of the parent’s
number of employees.
Third, at the country level, consistent with Dai et al. (2013), I controlled for Host
Market Size, Host Market Potential, and Host Market Inflation Rate, factors expected to
influence foreign subsidiary survival, to control for the effect of their variation over the
years of the study on foreign subsidiary survival. I measured host market size as the
logarithm of host country per capita gross domestic product (GDP). I measured host
market potential as the percentage change in GDP of the host country from one year to
the other. I measured host market inflation rate as the inflation, GDP Deflator (annual %),
for different years.

3.1.2.

Qualitative Approach
I interviewed 10 participants who had the following positions. Nine were working

at Canadian subsidiaries of foreign MNEs, mainly Japanese MNEs; six were subsidiary
CEOs; one was a subsidiary board member; and two were subsidiary TMT members. The
tenth was the Subsidiary Governance Senior Officer at the Canadian headquarters of a
very large Canadian-based MNE, who was responsible for governance of the local and
foreign subsidiaries of that MNE. In addition, one of the CEOs I interviewed was a
former Canadian subsidiary CEO and a current Director at the Japanese MNE
headquarters of that Canadian subsidiary. One of the major reasons for interviewing these
two latter participants was to get a headquarters perspective, in addition to the subsidiary
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perspective, on foreign subsidiary governance, so as to triangulate my data and reduce
bias.
Five of the participants worked in Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs and
the other five worked in Canadian subsidiaries of foreign non-Japanese MNEs of
different national origins. One important reason for interviewing CEOs, BOD members,
and / or TMT members of Canadian subsidiaries of non-Japanese MNEs as well as
Japanese MNEs was to enhance the generalizability of this thesis’ findings.

The

interviews were conducted in mid-2013. The Ethics Approval Notice, Introduction Letter,
and Consent Form are available in Appendix A.
The purpose of conducting these interviews was to enhance my understanding on
how MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries and why they govern them that way.
Consequently, in order to be interviewed, participants had to be CEOs, board members,
or TMT members of Canadian subsidiaries of foreign MNEs and particularly Japanese
MNEs. Participants were recruited mainly through personal contacts and referrals by
these personal contacts. Some were also recruited through the Ivey Alumni Relations
office and the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD) and Canadian Foundation for
Governance Research (CFGR).
The interviews were semi-structured; the interview guide is available in Appendix
B. Broadly, the interviews focused on the following three overarching questions: (1) How
do you influence the changes in your subsidiary’s governance mechanisms / structures,
namely the use of expatriates, ownership, and risk? (2) Why do you attempt to influence
the changes in these governance mechanisms / structures (i.e. the use of expatriates,
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ownership, and risk) in your subsidiary? and (3) How does your parent use these
governance mechanisms (i.e. ownership, expatriates, and risk) to govern your subsidiary?
The interviews were recorded and transcribed then coded and analyzed with
NVIVO (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Finally, following Bruning et al. (2012) and Yin’s
(2011) qualitative data presentation and composition approaches, my qualitative findings
were presented in a qualitative results section as brief direct or indirect explanations,
narratives, or quotations.

“It is generally accepted that measurement instruments affect that which they are
trying to measure, thus biasing the value of the measurement from the ‘true’ value. This
phenomenon is referred to as measurement error and there are often statistical and
mechanical ways to ‘correct’ for it (Lupton, 2011: v).” In qualitative research, such as the
one in this part of this thesis, the measurement device is the researcher. Accordingly, I
provide this brief reflexivity statement to help the reader understand my background,
experiences with the explored phenomenon, and how my background and experiences
may have shaped my interpretation of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013).
I am a person who has both Lebanese and Canadian citizenships. I was raised,
studied, and worked for several years in Lebanon. I recently lived, studied, and worked
for several years in Canada. In Lebanon, I lived in the Greater Beirut Area; Was raised by
a father who was an officer in the Lebanese Army and a mother who was a school
teacher; Earned a PhD in Psychology; Worked as a psychologist, university instructor,
and consultant; And was the founder and managing partner for my own consulting,
training, and recruitment company that served the Middle East & North Africa (MENA)
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region. In Canada, I pursued my second PhD in International Business and Strategy that I
am completing now, worked as a research assistant, and lived in London, Ontario for
around six years.
In Lebanon, I experienced firsthand how a business and government system that
is usually considered to be closer to a relation-based governance system works. In
Canada, I experienced firsthand as well how a different business and government system
that is usually considered to be closer to a rule-based governance system works (Li, Park,
& Li, 2004).
These

contrasting

experiences

definitely

enriched

and

broadened

my

understanding of corporate governance in general and comparative governance
mechanisms and practices in particular. However, I am an international business and
strategy scholar and I believe rule-based governance mechanisms and practices provide a
more efficient and a better environment for international business, foreign trade, and
strategic planning and management. Accordingly, I may be potentially biased in favor of
rule-based governance mechanisms and practices whether within MNEs or across
countries. Nevertheless, I hope that my potential biases have been mitigated by my
rigorous striving to collect and analyze my data with reflexive thought and honest
introspection.

3.2. Results
This section consists of two subsections, a quantitative results subsection and a
qualitative results subsection.
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3.2.1.

Quantitative Results
This subsection presents this study’s quantitative results. I used survival analysis,

namely the extended Cox regression technique, to test my hypotheses. An extended Cox
model is appropriate because the dependent variable is survival likelihood and the
independent and control variables are time-varying and the extended Cox model can
incorporate and test for such time-dependent covariates (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005).
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the study
variables. This correlation matrix shows that, among all covariates, there are only two
correlations slightly above 0.5, namely the correlation between Inflation Rate and Lg
Host Market Size and the correlation between Lg Expatriate Number and Lg Subsidiary
Employees. However, even these two correlations are below 0.6, which suggests that
multicollinearity should not be a concern. Nevertheless, there are several covariates that
are significantly correlated (p < 0.05). Therefore to ensure the absence of
multicollinearity and ensure the robustness of the results, I performed regressions and
collinearity diagnostics for all covariates one by one. That is, I regressed each covariate
on all the other covariates to get all their variance inflation factors (VIFs). All VIFs were
below two which ensures that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in the analyses
(Field, 2009).
I test my hypotheses using a four-stage hierarchical extended Cox regression
model. Table 3.2 presents the findings, in which my Risk Orientation construct is
operationalized as Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio, Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio
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Squared, and Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio Cubed. All four models are highly
significant (p < 0.001) and the -2 Log Likelihood decreases as one moves from Model 1
to Model 4. This suggests that each model fits the data better than the previous models.
The full model, Model 4 in Table 3.2, shows that all hypotheses were supported. For the
interpretation of results, a coefficient estimator with a negative value suggests a
decreased likelihood of foreign subsidiary exit or an increase in likelihood of foreign
subsidiary survival.
Model 1 is the baseline model. It includes only control variables. Among the
subsidiary-level controls, as expected, Model 1 shows that a foreign subsidiary’s age
(measured as Log of subsidiary age) and size (as measured by its Log of subsidiary
number of employees) are respectively marginally and highly significantly related to its
survival likelihood (p < 0.10 and p < 0.001 respectively). Moreover, the sector in which a
subsidiary operates is significantly associated with that subsidiary’s survival likelihood,
since the reference sector, manufacturing, in this categorical variable is significantly
related to foreign subsidiary survival likelihood (p < 0.001). The results show that
Trading subsidiaries are significantly more likely to survive than their manufacturing
counterparts (p < 0.001 and B is negative) and Services and Others subsidiaries are
marginally more likely to survive than their manufacturing counterparts (p < 0.10 and B
is negative). This may be attributed to the fact that Trading and Services subsidiaries
require less capital investment to survive (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003).

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Variables
Mean
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
SubsidiaryExit
.043
.202
LgSubsidiaryAge
1.105
.332
.016
LgSubsidiaryEmployees
1.520
.821
-.105** .275**
SubsidiarySector
1.834
.686
-.007 -.023 -.375**
LgParentEmployees
4.018
.653
.033
.226** .304** -.075**
ParentROA
.028
.051
-.043 -.052* .087** -.050* -.016
LgHostMarketSize
4.384
.111
-.014 .262** .086** -.065** -.107** .209**
HostMarketPotential
1.461
2.041
.056* .177** .100** -.018 .024
-.078** -.052*
*
**
InflationRate
2.170
1.166
-.032 .059 .001
-.015 -.072 .192** .586**
LgParentOwnershipRatio
1.908
.175
-.091** .017 -.155** .220** -.082** .018
.023
LgExpatriateNumber
.450
.338
-.146** .112** .587** -.194** .220** .052* -.072**
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio
1.006
.284
.067** .014 -.034 -.020 .261** -.450** -.218**
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioSquared 1.093
.539
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioCubed 1.250
.847
SubsidiaryAge
15.279
10.883
SubsidiaryEmployees
143.815
323.992
ParentEmployees
29305.079 52613.260
HostMarketSize
25101.003 7564.709
ParentOwnershipRatio
85.064
24.001
ExpatriateNumber
2.925
4.125
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Number of observations = 1621;
Number of Canadian subsidiaries = 196;
Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 142;
Number of Canadian subsidiary Exits = 69
Note: Variables 13 to 20 show descriptive statistics for the ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio squared and cubed and for several
before being log transformed; only variables 1-14 are part of the Cox Regression model.

8

9

10

11

-.271**
-.018 .037
.015
-.056* .098**
-.029 -.099** -.110** .068**

other variables in their raw form
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Table 3.2 Hierarchical Extended Cox Regression Predicting Subsidiary Exit
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
B
SE
B
Control Variables
LgSubsidiaryAge
-.991 +
.602
-1.570 *
LgSubsidiaryEmployees
-.825 ***
.146
-.459 *
SubsidiarySector (Manufacturing: Reference)
***
*
SubsidiarySector (Trading)
-1.195 ***
.305
-.873 **
SubsidiarySector (Services and Others)
-.514 +
.307
-.202
LgParentEmployees
.332 +
.198
.073
ParentROA
.372
2.605
3.489
LgHostMarketSize
-18.562 ***
3.936 -17.471 ***
HostMarketPotential
-.144 +
.086
-.132
InflationRate
.209
.133
.181
Main Variables
LgParentOwnershipRatio
-1.546 **
LgExpatriateNumber
-1.909 ***
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio
1.127 +
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioSquared
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioCubed
- 2 Log-Likelihood
760.817
Model Chi-Square
138.564 ***
Number of observations = 1621;
Number of Canadian subsidiaries = 196;
Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 142;
Number of Canadian subsidiary Exits = 69
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (all two-tailed)

731.636
169.461 ***

SE
.617
.184
.313
.333
.220
3.759
3.854
.087
.134
.522
.566
.600

Model 3
B

SE

-1.632 **
-.435 *
**
-.973 **
-.191
.123
3.762
-17.220 ***
-.136
.179

.321
.333
.227
3.547
3.887
.086
.134

-1.538 **
-1.887 ***
-3.030
2.223

.514
.571
2.574
1.365

729.152
173.328 ***

.623
.183

Model 4
B
-1.680 **
-.497 **
**
-1.064 ***
-.232
.166
6.324 **
-17.194 ***
-.137
.181
-1.544
-2.023
20.879
-25.193
9.727

**
***
*
*
**

SE
.618
.184
.328
.334
.214
2.288
3.830
.086
.132
.512
.573
9.585
10.120
3.438

721.211
180.504 ***
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In this baseline model, among the parent-level controls, parent size (as measured
by the Log of parent number of employees) is marginally negatively related to subsidiary
survival (p < 0.10). This relationship shows that foreign subsidiaries of smaller MNEs are
more likely to survive than those of larger MNEs (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Dhanaraj &
Beamish, 2009). This is consistent with Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) organizational
complexity notion, which suggests that while parent size provides a stronger resource
base it increases vulnerability to local demands. It is also in line with Franko’s (1971)
findings that suggest that MNEs with larger parents have more flexibility to structure
their operations in a country. Larger firms have a greater ability to move subsidiaries to
new locations within a country or region and consolidate several subsidiaries into a single
unit, thus decreasing the likelihood of their foreign subsidiaries’ survival (Chung, Lee,
Beamish, & Isobe, 2010). Meanwhile, parent performance (as measured by their ROA)
had no observable relationship with subsidiary survival.
Among the country-level controls, as expected, a subsidiary’s host market size (as
measured by the Log of the host market’s per capita GDP) and host market potential (as
measured by the host market’s percentage change in GDP) were respectively highly and
marginally related to subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 and p < 0.10 respectively). This
suggests that foreign subsidiaries operating in larger markets and in markets that have a
higher potential for growth are more likely to survive than their counterparts operating in
smaller markets and in markets that have a lower potential for growth. However, in this
baseline model, host market inflation rate was not significantly related to subsidiary
survival. This may be due to the fact that the relation between host market inflation and
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subsidiary survival is an indirect one. Inflation usually decreases market growth which is
expected to ultimately decrease subsidiary survival.
Model 2 includes the two independent variables, parent ownership ratio and
expatriate number, and the linear form of the third independent variable, parent sectoradjusted debt ratio, in addition to the control variables in Model 1. The results of the
controls in Model 2 are broadly similar to those in Model 1 except for the parent size
variable. The relationship between this control and subsidiary survival likelihood
becomes non-significant (p > 0.10).
More importantly, Model 2 shows, as expected, that there is a significant
logarithmic relationship between a parent’s ownership level in its foreign subsidiary and
that foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.01). Furthermore, it also shows that
there is a significant logarithmic relationship between the number of expatriates in a
foreign subsidiary and that subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.001). These two results
clearly support the first two sub-hypotheses, namely H1a and H2a. They demonstrate that
as parent ownership and number of expatriates in a subsidiary increase and agency
problems decrease, subsidiary self-serving behaviors decline. However they decline at a
decreasing rate, as increments in the ownership levels and expatriate numbers in the
lower end will have a larger impact in reducing potential for subsidiary self-serving
behavior, and thus agency costs, than similar ones at the higher end. Consequently,
increments in the ownership levels and expatriate numbers in the lower end will have a
larger impact in increasing subsidiary survival than similar ones at the higher end. In
addition, Model 2 shows that there is only a marginal relationship between the linear
form of the third independent variable, parent sector-adjusted debt ratio, and foreign
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subsidiary survival likelihood. This suggests that basically there is no linear relationship
between parent risk orientation and foreign subsidiary survival likelihood.
Model 3 includes the parent sector-adjusted debt ratio squared variable on top of
the variables in Model 2. The results of the variables (controls and independent variables)
in Model 3 are generally similar to the ones in Model 2 except for the linear form of the
parent sector-adjusted debt ratio. In Model 3 this variables became non-significant (p >
0.1). More importantly, Model 3 shows that there is no significant relationship between
the quadratic form of the third independent variable, parent sector-adjusted debt ratio
squared, and foreign subsidiary survival likelihood. This suggests that there is no
significant quadratic relationship between parent risk orientation and foreign subsidiary
survival likelihood.
Model 4 includes the parent sector-adjusted debt ratio cubed variable on top of the
variables in Model 3. The results of the variables (controls and independent variables) in
Model 4 are broadly similar to the ones in Model 3 except for the parent performance (as
measured by parent ROA) variable. In this model, parent performance was significantly
negatively related to foreign subsidiary survival likelihood (p < 0.01). Similar to Franko’s
(1971) findings, this can be attributed to the fact that better performing parents have more
flexibility to structure and move their subsidiaries within a country and to consolidate
subsidiaries into a single unit.
Most interestingly, Model 4 clearly shows that once parent sector-adjusted debt
ratio cubed is included in this full model, all three relationships between the three parent
sector-adjusted debt ratio variables (parent sector-adjusted debt ratio, parent sectoradjusted debt ratio squared, and parent sector-adjusted debt ratio cubed) and foreign
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subsidiary survival likelihood, become significant (p < 0.05, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01
respectively). Adding this last cubed variable to the model made all three risk orientation
variables significant when previously the first two risk orientation variables were
respectively only marginally significant and non-significant. This supports the argument
that the relationship between risk orientation and subsidiary survival is a cubic and not a
linear or quadratic one. The positive and negative values of the coefficients of the three
risk orientation variables suggest that the relationship between parent risk orientation and
foreign subsidiary survival likelihood has an s-shaped form (see Figure 3.1 for a graph of
the relationship between risk orientation and subsidiary exit likelihood; The relationship
between risk orientation and subsidiary survival likelihood would have an inverse graph
but because of the data’s structure I could only draw the graph of the subsidiary exit
relationship in Figure 3.1). This clearly supports the third sub-hypothesis, H3a.
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Figure 3.1 Relationship between Risk Orientation (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary
Governance Mechanism) and Subsidiary Exit Likelihood
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3.2.2.

Qualitative Results
“I don't believe that there is a direct correlation between governance and

profitability. I think it is the other way around. It is more of a null hypothesis. There is a
correlation between governance and lack of failure.” – Robert G. Bertram

This subsection presents this study’s qualitative results. The purpose of my
qualitative analysis was to provide a better understanding of how and why the use of
subsidiary-level and parent-level foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms, such as
ownership, expatriates, and risk orientation, increase the survival likelihood and
profitability of foreign subsidiaries of MNEs.
First, my interviews corroborated my quantitative findings in that most of my
participants believed that foreign subsidiaries that are more likely to survive are governed
by their MNE parents through higher parent ownership, higher number of expatriates, and
lower risk as MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms. These qualitative
findings were consistent with my quantitative results.
Second, these interviews complemented my quantitative findings in that they
clarified how subsidiaries that are more likely to survive are governed by their parents
and why they are governed that way. For instance, one participant explained that
subsidiaries “would survive better because there will be insurance of compliance with
[host country and parent country regulations], in other words, the risk of fines or penalties
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would be mitigated because somebody [i.e. the parent] was making sure that they’re in
compliance with their regulatory environment.”
Furthermore, one subsidiary general manager, who served as a subsidiary
manager in more than one country for a very well-known and -respected MNE, believed
that there absolutely was a relationship between higher parent ownership in a foreign
subsidiary and higher foreign subsidiary survival likelihood. He explained that, compared
to independent distributors of foreign MNEs, “we were willing to take losses in certain
[wholly-owned subsidiaries] in order to have a longer term horizon that would make
these [temporarily losing wholly owned subsidiaries] profitable over the long run. The
company [i.e. the MNE] was willing to invest for the longer term whereas an independent
distributor just would not be doing that.”
A subsidiary general manager, who himself was an expatriate, also explained how
using expatriates as a subsidiary governance mechanism increased subsidiaries’ survival
likelihoods at his parent corporation. He explained that in his parent corporation, they
usually send expatriates to establish foreign subsidiaries. Once the subsidiary’s
performance is on track they are fine with locals running the subsidiary. In that case, they
still have expatriate teams go on short assignments to audit the behavior and performance
of the subsidiary on a biennial basis. However, when a subsidiary is not behaving or
performing as expected, such as not following the parent’s policies or meeting the
parent’s targets, one or more expatriates are sent to fix these problems by reinforcing the
parent’s culture and expectations.
In addition, another subsidiary CEO, whose company was number two in its
industry worldwide, suggested that, following his parent’s risk guidelines, his subsidiary
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took moderate risks (for example, customer financing risks), “very similar to industry risk
norms taken by our top two competitors but did not take extreme risks similar to the ones
taken by our number four, five, and six competitors. Nevertheless we were more flexible
than our number one competitor. [For example, we would do] letter of credit or just
invoice, but we would never do a consignment shipment, never!” He added “since we
were not outside of range of our competition, this was fine.” This interview anecdotally
confirmed my quantitative findings related to the impact of risk orientation on subsidiary
survival and briefly described certain types of subsidiary risks that would threaten these
subsidiaries’ survival.

What was most interesting was the quote provided at the beginning of this section.
This quote was provided by Robert G. Bertram, an extremely experienced governance
expert who has been a director on over 12 company boards. This quote suggested that
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms may impact foreign subsidiary
survival but not necessarily impact foreign subsidiary profitability. Thus, it prompted me
to test, not only for the relationship between MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
mechanisms and foreign subsidiary survival, but also for the relationship between these
governance mechanisms and foreign subsidiary profitability. Testing for both of these
relationships using the small Canadian subsidiaries sample showed that although
governance impacts survival it may not necessarily impact profitability. However, given
that the Canadian sample was a small sample, and that testing for no governanceprofitability relationship (i.e. arguing and testing for the null hypothesis) required a big
enough sample to ensure enough statistical power, I embarked on testing this relationship
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more formally in the main study in the next chapter. Therefore the next chapter presents
the methods and results related to testing for the relationships between governance and
survival on the one hand and governance and profitability on the other hand using a large
multi-country study.
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CHAPTER 4
4. MAIN MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY: METHODS AND RESULTS

This main study constitutes of two sub-studies, a multi-country survival analysis
and a multi-country profitability analysis.

4.1. Multi-Country Survival Analysis
4.1.1.
4.1.1.1.

Methods
Sample and Data
The purpose of this analysis was to address the first research question (‘How do

MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries to ensure better performance measured as
foreign subsidiary survival and foreign subsidiary profitability?’) using a large
longitudinal sample of Japanese MNEs with subsidiaries in multiple countries and
regions from 1990 till 2008. This multi-country survival analysis tested Hypotheses 1a,
2a, 3a, 4a, and 5. It used a very large sample compiled from the TK dataset, NEEDS
databases, World Bank economic and governance data, and Centre d’Etudes Prospectives
et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) data. The objectives were to 1) confirm the
generalizability of the corresponding survival analysis findings from the Canadian pilot
study for hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a, and 2) broaden the analysis to include a fourth
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanism, regional headquarters (RHQ)
(H4a), and the interaction between ownership and expatriates.
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4.1.1.2.

Variables

Dependent Variable (DV)
Subsidiary Exit: Following previous studies on subsidiary survival (Dai et al.,
2013), this study’s dependent variable Subsidiary Exit is an indicator variable, SubExit,
that takes a value of 1 if subsidiary x exits at time t, and 0 if it remains (survives).
Observations start in 1990, and continue until an exit occurs, or they are right-censored in
2008. I follow Delios and Beamish (2001) in treating delisted subsidiaries from the
sample as exits, because the TK dataset is almost exhaustive for all cases of Japanese
FDI. This approach has been validated by Delios and Beamish (2004) in which they
compared identified cases of exit in the TK dataset with reported cases of exit. For the
period 1990–2008 there were 2,757 identified exits out of 12,101 foreign subsidiaries and
a total of 84, 369 observations.
Independent Variables (IVs) and Modifier Variable (MV)
Ownership Ratio: Consistent with previous research ownership ratio is measured
as the logarithm of the percentage of the focal subsidiary’s equity owned by the largest
Japanese owner. The largest Japanese owner is used because typically it is considered the
Japanese parent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004).
Expatriate Number: This thesis theorizes expatriate number simultaneously as
an independent variable (main variable) and a modifier variable that amplifies
(strengthens) the effect of ownership ratio on foreign subsidiary survival. Consistent with
previous research (Chung & Beamish, 2005; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Plourde et al.,
2013) I measure expatriate number as the logarithm of the number of expatriates in the
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subsidiary to test for the nonlinear logarithmic relationship between expatriate number
and foreign subsidiary survival.
Risk Orientation: I measured risk orientation as the Japanese parent’s sectoradjusted debt ratio. To calculate this measure I first calculated the Japanese parent’s debt
ratio (i.e. total liabilities divided by total assets). Second, I calculated the debt ratio for
each of the three sectors: Manufacturing, Trade, and Services & Others (see next page for
a detailed description of sector) by adding the debt ratios of all the Japanese parents in a
sector and dividing their total by the number of parents in that sector. Finally, I divided
each Japanese parent’s debt ratio by its sector’s debt ratio to get each firm’s sectoradjusted debt ratio. Then, I log-transformed the sector-adjusted debt ratio to test the
hypothesized nonlinear logarithmic relationship between risk orientation and survival.
Using a firm’s sector-adjusted debt ratio as a proxy to measure its risk orientation is
appropriate for several reasons. First, firm debt ratios have been used in the literature to
measure firm risk (Abor, 2007; Beaver et al., 1970; Berger et al., 1997; Friend & Lang,
1988; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wen et al., 2002). Second, among the other available
debt ratio measures, I selected the total liabilities divided by total assets measure as it has
been shown to exhibit the highest association with risk (Beaver, 1966). Third, the pilot
study’s analysis of Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs found that sector appears to
influence governance mechanisms in general (Coles et al., 2001) and corporate debt
ratios in Japan in particular (Remmers et al., 1974).
Subsidiary Governed by Regional Headquarters (RHQ): I measure this
variable as an indicator variable. 1 indicates that the Japanese MNE parent has a RHQ in
the region in which the MNE parent’s foreign subsidiaries operate and suggests that that
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parent’s subsidiaries in that region are governed by a RHQ. 0 indicates that the Japanese
MNE parent does not have a RHQ in the region in which the MNE parent’s foreign
subsidiaries operate and suggests that that parent’s subsidiaries in that region are not
governed by a RHQ. To identify world regions I follow Delios and Beamish (2005) and
consider the world to consist of seven geographic regions, namely Africa, Asia, Europe,
Latin America, Middle East & North Arica (MENA), North America, and Oceania.
Control Variables
This study controlled for several variables that the literature suggests may be
possible alternative explanations for subsidiary survival and that could consequently
confound my results. First, at the subsidiary level, I controlled for the following
variables.
Subsidiary age: Consistent with (Dai et al., 2013) I controlled for subsidiary age
to account for (1) the possible effect of the liability of newness and (2) the possible effect
of the ability of older subsidiaries to adapt to host-country conditions, on subsidiary
survival. Subsidiary age was measured as the logarithm of the number of years a
subsidiary has operated since its date of establishment in the host country.
Subsidiary Size: I controlled for subsidiary size to account for liabilities of
smallness and structural inertia since previous studies have shown a positive relationship
between the size and survival of foreign subsidiaries (Li, 1995). Subsidiary size was
measured as the logarithm of the total number of subsidiary employees.
Subsidiary sector: I controlled for subsidiary sector. All the industries were
grouped into 3 broad sectors (manufacturing = 1, trade = 2, and services & others =3).
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Second, at the parent level, consistent with Kim et al. (2012) I controlled for
Parent Size, Parent Performance, and Parent Sector since these variables are known to
usually affect subsidiary survival (Delios & Beamish, 2001). Parent size was measured as
the logarithm of the parent’s number of employees, parent performance, as the return on
assets of the parent, and parent sector, as a categorical variables with manufacturing = 1,
trade = 2, and services & others = 3.
Third, at the country level, consistent with Dai et al. (2013), I controlled for Host
Market Size, Host Market Potential, and Host Market Inflation Rate, factors expected to
influence foreign subsidiary survival. Host market size was measured as the logarithm of
host country per capita gross domestic product (GDP). Host market potential was
measured as the percentage change in GDP of the host country from one year to the
other. Host market inflation rate was measured as the inflation, GDP Deflator (annual %),
for different years.
I also controlled for Geographic Distance, Host Country Political Stability, and
Geographic region. Geographic Distance measured the distance between Japan and the
host country. I compiled this data from the GeoDist database published by the Centre
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Information Internationale (CEPII). This dataset measures
geographic distances between countries following the great circle formula, which uses
latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities / agglomerations (in terms of
population).
Host Country Political Stability ranked the political stability of all countries on a
scale from 0 to 100 (World Bank Governance Indicators). Other World Bank Governance
indicators, such as other political and legal governance indicators, were initially include
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in the statistical models, however they were later remove due to potential
multicollinearity problems. As implied above, Geographic Region was measured as a
categorical variable with Africa = 1, Asia = 2, Europe = 3, Latin America = 4, Middle
East & North Arica (MENA) = 5, North America = 6, and Oceania = 7.

4.1.2.

Results
The purpose of this multi-country survival analysis was to investigate how

Japanese MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries to ensure better foreign
subsidiary survival. Survival analysis, namely the extended Cox regression technique,
was used to test the hypotheses. An extended Cox model is appropriate because the
dependent variable is foreign subsidiary survival likelihood and the independent and
control variables are time-varying and the extended Cox model can incorporate and test
for such time-dependent covariates (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005).
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for this study’s
variables. This correlation matrix shows that, among all covariates, there are only four
correlations above 0.5, namely the correlations between Log Host Market Size and
Political Stability, Log Host Market Size and Subsidiary Geographic Region, Parent
Sector and Subsidiary Sector, and Geographic Distance and Subsidiary Geographic
Region. Several covariates are significantly correlated (p < 0.05). Therefore to ensure the
absence of multicollinearity and ensure the robustness of my results, I performed
regressions and collinearity diagnostics for all covariates one by one. That is, each
covariate was regressed on all the other covariates to obtain all their variance inflation
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factors (VIFs). All VIFs were below four which ensures that multicollinearity is unlikely
to be an issue in the analyses (Field, 2009).
Table 4.2 presents the Extended Cox Regression results. All 6 models are highly
significant (p < 0.001) and the -2 Log Likelihood decreases as one moves from one
Model to the next. All the changes in -2 Log Likelihood from one Model to the next are
significant. These results suggest that each model fits the data significantly better than the
previous models. The full model (Model 6) in Table 4.2, shows that all hypotheses,
except the parent sector-adjusted debt ratio hypothesis, were fully supported. The parent
sector-adjusted debt ratio hypothesis was only partially supported as it emerged as a
nonlinear logarithmic relationship rather than the initially hypothesized nonlinear sshaped relationship. For the interpretation of results, a coefficient estimator with a
negative value suggests a decreased likelihood of foreign subsidiary exit or an increased
likelihood of foreign subsidiary survival.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
Variables
Mean
S.D.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1 SubExit
.033
.178
2 LgSubAge
.930
.403 -.008*
3 LgSubEmployees
1.680
.794 -.066** .191**
4 SubSector
1.762
.769 .033** .035** -.459**
5 LgParentEmployees
3.774
.693 .014** .093** .334** -.016**
6 ParentROA
3.230
5.452 -.050** .001 .006 -.018** -.048**
7 ParentSector
1.415
.710 .038** .010** -.187** .596** -.116** -.033**
8 LgHostMarketSize
3.928
.617 .026** .248** -.341** .252** -.060** .032** -.010**
9 HostMarketPotential
3.675
3.927 -.009** -.195** .131** -.127** -.029** .100** -.003 -.387**
10 InflationRate
14.187 155.194 -.002 .038** .017** -.018** .022** -.003 -.011** -.066** -.080**
11 GeogDistance
6779.179 3880.884 .027** .227** -.174** .156** .067** -.014** -.020** .488** -.476** .192**
12 PoliticalStability
57.537
25.409 .009** .116** -.292** .210** -.012** -.044** -.009** .751** -.294** -.071** .299**
13 SubGeographicRegion
3.217
1.703 .028** .153** -.193** .152** -.007* -.012** -.008* .571** -.347** .024** .697** .355**
14 LgParentOwnership
1.841
.242 -.045** .026** -.223** .154** -.085** .050** -.041** .335** -.085** .007* .184** .241** .189**
Ratio
15 LgExpatNumber
.561
.360 -.090** .121** .448** -.089** .250** -.015** -.078** .036** -.020** -.008* .042** .019** .049** .205**
16 LgParentSector
.297
.073 .023** .002 .084** .011** .341** -.399** -.014** -.077** -.043** .027** .054** .027** .024** -.116** .087**
AdjustedDebtRatio
17 SubGovernedByRHQ
.271
.445 .000 -.007 .057** .022** .178** -.037** -.060** .021** .015** -.037** -.055** .036** -.040** -.024** .057** .105**
18 SubAge
12.149
9.707
19 SubEmployees
233.595 917.450
20 ParentEmployees
20017.325 42091.172
21 HostMarketSize
17063.647 14693.117
22 ParentOwnershipRatio
77.464
28.441
23 ExpatNumber
4.537
9.524
24 ParentSectorAdjusted
1.009
.323
DebtRatio
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Number of observations = 84,369;
Number of foreign subsidiaries = 12, 101;
Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 1,540;
Number of foreign subsidiary Exits = 2,757.
Note: Variables 18 to 24 show descriptive statistics for variables in their raw form before being log transformed; only variables 1-17 are part of the Cox Regression
model.
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Table 4.2 Hierarchical Extended Cox Regression Predicting Subsidiary Exit
Variables

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Model 1
B
SE

Model 2
B
SE

Model 3
B
SE

Model 4
B
SE

Model 5
B
SE

Model 6
B
SE

Control Variables
LgSubAge
-2.90 *** .07
-2.90 *** .07
-2.99 *** .07
-2.99 *** .07
-2.99 *** .07
-3.00 *** .07
LgSubEmployees
-.63 *** .03
-.65 *** .03
-.38 *** .03
-.36 *** .03
-.36 *** .03
-.37 *** .03
SubSector (Manufacturing: Reference)
***
***
***
***
***
***
SubSector (Trading)
-.48 *** .05
-.37 *** .05
-.28 *** .05
-.28 *** .05
-.27 *** .05
-.28 *** .05
SubSector (Services & Others)
-.12 †
.07
.01
.07
.10
.07
.10
.07
.12 †
.07
.11 †
.07
LgParentEmployees
.33 *** .03
.28 *** .03
.32 *** .03
.26 *** .03
.27 *** .03
.27 *** .03
ParentROA
-.03 *** .00
-.03 *** .00
-.03 *** .00
-.02 *** .00
-.02 *** .00
-.02 *** .00
ParentSector (Manufacturing: Reference)
***
***
***
***
***
***
ParentSector (Trading)
.65 *** .05
.51 *** .05
.51 *** .05
.53 *** .05
.53 *** .05
.54 *** .05
ParentSector (Services & Others)
.13 †
.07
.04
.07
.04
.07
.03
.07
.02
.07
.03
.07
LgHostMarketSize
-.41 *** .07
-.32 *** .07
-.26 *** .07
-.22 *** .07
-.23 *** .07
-.24 *** .07
HostMarketPotential
.00
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
InflationRate
.00 *** .00
.00 *** .00
.00 *** .00
.00 *** .00
.00 *** .00
.00 *** .00
GeogDistance
.00 *** .00
.00 *** .00
.00 ** .00
.00 ** .00
.00 ** .00
.00 ** .00
PoliticalStabilityRank
.01 *** .00
.01 *** .00
.01 *** .00
.01 *** .00
.01 *** .00
.01 *** .00
SubGeographicRegion (Africa: Reference)
***
***
***
***
***
***
SubGeographicRegion (Asia)
-1.37 *** .28
-1.39 *** .28
-1.03 *** .28
-1.06 *** .28
-1.03 *** .28
-.98 *** .28
SubGeographicRegion (Europe)
-.53 *
.25
-.56 *
.25
-.38
.25
-.39
.25
-.36
.25
-.32
.25
SubGeographicRegion (Latin America)
.11
.25
.12
.25
.13
.25
.12
.25
.12
.25
.16
.25
SubGeographicRegion (MENA)
-.39
.31
-.50
.31
-.42
.31
-.45
.31
-.45
.31
-.43
.31
SubGeographicRegion (North America)
-.21
.25
-.27
.25
-.02
.25
-.06
.25
-.03
.25
.02
.25
SubGeographicRegion (Oceania)
-.91 *** .27
-.93 *** .27
-.78 ** .27
-.83 ** .27
-.82 ** .27
-.78 ** .27
Main Variables
LgParentOwnershipRatio
-1.04 *** .06
-.71 *** .07
-.68 *** .07
-.68 *** .07
-.91 *** .09
LgExpatNumber
-1.27 *** .07
-1.28 *** .07
-1.29 *** .07
-2.72 *** .39
LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio
1.80 *** .32
1.85 *** .32
1.81 *** .32
SubGovernedByRHQ
-.09 *
.04
-.09 *
.04
Interaction
LgExpatNumber*LgParentOwnershipRatio
.80 *** .21
- 2 Log-Likelihood
54448.89
54231.45
53905.55
53873.54
53869.04
53854.34
Model Chi-Square
3588.19 ***
3879.88 ***
4105.56 ***
4118.09 ***
4122.97 ***
4230.00 ***
Change in - 2 Log-Likelihood
3288.07 ***
217.45 ***
325.90 ***
32.01 ***
4.49 *
14.70 ***
Number of observations = 84,369; Number of foreign subsidiaries = 12, 101; Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 1,540; Number of foreign subsidiary Exits = 2,757.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (all two-tailed)
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Model 1 is the baseline model. It includes only control variables. Among the
subsidiary-level controls, as expected, Model 1 shows that subsidiary age (as measured as
Log of subsidiary age) and subsidiary size (as measured by its Log of subsidiary number
of employees) are both positively significantly related to subsidiary survival likelihood (p
< 0.001 for both). Moreover, subsidiary sector is significantly associated with subsidiary
survival likelihood since the reference sector, manufacturing, is significantly related to
foreign subsidiary survival likelihood (p < 0.001). The results show that Trading
subsidiaries are significantly more likely to survive than their manufacturing counterparts
(p < 0.001 and B is negative) and Services and Others subsidiaries are marginally more
likely to survive than their manufacturing counterparts (p < 0.10 and B is negative). This
may be attributed to the fact that Trading and Services subsidiaries require less capital
investment to survive (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003).
In this baseline model, among the parent-level controls, parent size (as measured
by the Log of parent number of employees) is negatively significantly related to
subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 and B is positive). This relationship shows that foreign
subsidiaries of smaller MNEs are more likely to survive than those of larger MNEs
(Delios & Beamish, 2001; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009). This is consistent with Kostova
and Zaheer’s (1999) organizational complexity notion, which suggests that while parent
size provides a stronger resource base, it increases vulnerability to local demands. It is
also in line with Franko’s (1971) findings that suggest that MNEs with larger parents
have more flexibility to structure their operations in a country. Larger firms have a
greater ability to move subsidiaries to new locations within a country or region and
consolidate several subsidiaries into a single unit, thus decreasing the likelihood of their
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foreign subsidiaries’ survival (Chung et al., 2010). Moreover, as expected, parent
performance (as measured by ROA) is positively significantly related with subsidiary
survival. Furthermore, parent sector is significantly related to subsidiary survival
(Manufacturing: p < 0.001) and subsidiaries with parents that are in the trading sector are
less likely to survive (p < 0.001 and B is positive) and subsidiaries with parents that are
in services and other sectors are marginally less likely to survive (p < 0.1 and B is
positive) than subsidiaries with parents that are in the manufacturing sector.
Among the country-level controls, as expected, a subsidiary’s host market size (as
measured by the Log of the host market’s per capita GDP) and host market inflation rate
were respectively negatively and positively related to subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 for
both and Bs negative and positive respectively). Whereas, a subsidiary’s host market
potential (as measured by the host market’s percentage change in GDP) had no
observable relationship with a subsidiary’s survival (p > 0.1).
Moreover, a subsidiary’s geographic distance from Japan was negatively related
(p < 0.001 and B is positive) to a subsidiary’s survival. Unexpectedly, host country
political stability was negatively related to subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 and B is
positive). This may be attributed to the fact that subsidiaries operating in politically stable
countries may be faced with stronger competition due to the attractiveness of operating in
those countries which may increase their likelihood of failure compared to subsidiaries
operating in politically unstable countries but prone to lower competition as well.
Moreover, research shows that subsidiaries operating in more politically unstable
countries may develop political experience and capabilities that may enhance their
chances for survival (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Frynas & Mellahi, 2003).
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Furthermore, a subsidiary’s geographic region was significantly related to a
subsidiary’s survival likelihood (for the reference category, Africa, p < 0.001). The other
categories of this variable show that, subsidiaries in Asia, Europe, and Oceania are
significantly more likely to survive than their counterparts in Africa (p < 0.001, p < 0.05,
and p < 0.001 respectively and B is negative for all).
Model 2 tests for H1a. It includes this study’s first main variable, log parent
ownership ratio. The results of the controls in Model 2 are widely similar to those in
Model 1. The results for log parent ownership ratio suggest that, as expected, there is a
significant positive nonlinear logarithmic relationship between an MNE parent’s
ownership ratio in its foreign subsidiary and that foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood
(p < 0.001 and B is negative). Thus H1a is supported.
Model 3 tests for H2a. It includes this study’s second main variable, log expatriate
number. The results of the controls in Model 3 are widely similar to those in Model 1.
The results for log expatriate number suggest that, as expected, there is a significant
positive nonlinear logarithmic relationship between the number of expatriates in a foreign
subsidiary and that foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.001 and B is negative).
Thus H2a is supported.
Model 4 initially tested for H3a, namely that there is a negative (declining)
nonlinear s-shaped relationship between an MNE parent’s sector-adjusted debt ratio and
its foreign subsidiary’s survival. Given that parent sector-adjusted debt ratio squared and
parent sector-adjusted debt ratio cubed were found non-significant in this multi-country
sample, they are not reported in Table 4.2. However, Model 4 reports the coefficient of
the relationship between log parent sector-adjusted debt ratio and foreign subsidiary
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survival. This coefficient was found to be significant. The results of the controls in Model
4 are widely similar to those in Model 1. The results for log parent sector-adjusted debt
ratio suggest that there is a significant negative nonlinear logarithmic relationship
between an MNE parent’s sector-adjusted debt ratio and its foreign subsidiary’s survival
likelihood (p < 0.001 and B is positive). Thus H3a is partially supported since the
relationship between parent risk orientation and subsidiary survival still emerged as
significant negative nonlinear, although logarithmic rather than s-shaped in form.
Model 5 tests for H4a. It includes this study’s fourth main variable, subsidiary
governed by RHQ. The results of the controls in Model 5 are widely similar to those in
Model 1. The results for subsidiary governed by RHQ suggest that, as expected, a foreign
subsidiary that is governed by a RHQ is significantly more likely to survive than its
counterpart that is not governed by a RHQ (p < 0.05 and B is negative). Thus H4a is fully
supported.
Model 6 tests for H5. It includes the effect of this study’s interaction between
parent ownership ratio and expatriate number on foreign subsidiary survival. The results
of the controls in Model 6 are widely similar to those in Model 1. The results for the
interaction in Model 6 suggest that, as expected, the number of expatriates in a foreign
subsidiary modifies (amplifies / strengthens) the positive effect of the MNE parent’s
ownership ratio in that subsidiary on that subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.001 and
B is positive). Thus H5 is fully supported.
To probe this significant interaction further, three Cox regression models were run
at three levels of the modifier variable, expatriate number. The first model was run at the
low number of expatriates equal to zero expatriates (the values for this model are the ones
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reported in Table 4.2). The second model was run at the medium number of expatriates
equal to four expatriates. The number four expatriates was chosen because the mean
number of expatriates in the sample was 4.537 and four expatriates was more
theoretically meaningful than 4.537 given that human beings cannot be divided into parts.
The third model was run at the high number of expatriates equal to eight expatriates to be
equidistant from zero expatriates with respect to the closest number to the mean
expatriate number, four expatriates. The regression coefficients for the parent ownership
ratio variables at low expatriate number, medium expatriate number, and high expatriate
number were Bat low expatriates = -0.909 (significant, p < 0.001), Bat medium expatriates =

-0.348

(significant, p < 0.01), and Bat high expatriates = -0.148 (not significant, p > 0.1).
These results suggest the following. When the number of expatriates is low, the
effect of higher levels of parent ownership on subsidiary survival is high and significant
(the slope between ownership and subsidiary failure is 0.909 and negative and
significant). When the number of expatriates is medium, the effect of higher levels of
parent ownership on subsidiary survival is medium and significant (the slope between
ownership and subsidiary failure is 0.348 and negative and significant). When the number
of expatriates is high, the effect of higher levels of parent ownership on subsidiary
survival is low and non-significant (the slope between ownership and subsidiary failure is
0.148 and negative and non-significant). Therefore, as the number of expatriates in a
foreign subsidiary increases, the effect of higher parent ownership levels in that
subsidiary on that subsidiary’s survival decreases. This further supports H5.
To identify the relative importance of each main variable in explaining variability
in the probability of foreign subsidiary survival, one needs to compare the changes in -2
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log-likelihood resulting from the inclusion of each new main variable and interaction
term in Table 4.2. -2 log-likelihood is a measure of how much unexplained variability
there is in the dependent variable; therefore the difference or change in -2 log-likelihood
indicates how much new variance has been explained by each new model (Field, 2009).
Comparing the different changes in -2 Log-Likelihood resulting from the inclusion of
each new main variable or interaction term in Table 4.2, one can notice the following.
The relative importance of each variable, from the most important to the least important,
in explaining new variance in the probability of foreign subsidiary survival, is as follows:
expatriate number (change in -2 log-likelihood = 325.90, p < 0.001); parent ownership
ratio (change in -2 log-likelihood = 217.45, p < 0.001); parent sector-adjusted debt ratio
(change in -2 log-likelihood = 32.01, p < 0.001); interaction between ownership and
expatriates (change in -2 log-likelihood = 14.70, p < 0.001); and subsidiary governed by
RHQ (change in -2 log-likelihood = 4.49, p < 0.05). These results suggest that a change
in the number of expatriates led to the highest change in the probability of survival of a
foreign subsidiary, whereas a change of a subsidiary from not being governed by an RHQ
to being governed by an RHQ led to the lowest change in the probability of survival of
that foreign subsidiary.
The same above analyses were replicated using a sample that included only
subsidiaries with 20 employees or more and subsidiaries with Japanese parents with an
ownership ratio of 5% or more. The same significant results were found for Log
Ownership Ratio, Log Expatriate Number, Log Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio, and
the interaction between Log Ownership Ratio and Log Expatriate Number. Only
Subsidiary Governed by RHQ became non-significant. Upon further analysis, it was
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found that RHQs had a median number of employees of 20 employees whereas
subsidiaries that are not RHQ had a median number of employees equal to 45. Moreover,
the total number of subsidiary-years that were RHQs was 9950, whereas the total number
of subsidiary-years that were not RHQs was 213,133. When subsidiaries with fewer than
20 employees were deleted around half of the RHQs in the sample were dropped,
whereas far fewer non-RHQ subsidiaries were dropped from the original sample.
These important changes in the relative percentages between RHQs and non-RHQ
subsidiaries decreased the explanatory power of RHQs relative to non-RHQs. To avoid
understating the impact of a subsidiary being governed by an RHQ on its survival, this
study presents the results of the original sample in Table 4.2, especially that the results
for the other main variables are the same for both.

4.2. Multi-Country Profitability Analyses
4.2.1.

Methods
This multi-country profitability analysis is in some ways similar to the multi-

country survival analysis, however using profitability, rather than survival, as the
dependent variable, and using several cross-sections of the data, rather than longitudinal
data, for the statistical analyses. The purpose of this analysis was to answer the second
part of this thesis’ first research question (‘How do MNE parents govern their foreign
subsidiaries to ensure better foreign subsidiary profitability?’) using a large sample of
Japanese MNEs with subsidiaries in multiple countries and regions. To answer this part
of the first research question, this study tested Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b using
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several multinomial and binary logistic regression analyses. Thus, to test these
hypotheses, one multinomial and one binary logistic regression analysis was conducted
for each individual year from 2000 till 2008. That is, nine multinomial regressions and
nine binary regressions, a total of 18 logistic regression analyses, were conducted to test
for these four hypotheses. The purpose of repeating these regressions over 9 years was to
ensure the robustness of the results.
Using multinomial and binary logistic regression is appropriate because, as
explained in more detail later, the dependent variable was correspondingly either a
trichotomous or a dichotomous categorical variable. Multinomial logistic regression is
appropriate for analyzing data with a categorical dependent variable with multiple
categories. Binary logistic regression is appropriate for analyzing data with a categorical
dependent variable with only two categories (Field, 2009).
The data sources used to build the datasets utilized in these multi-country
profitability logistic regression analyses were the same data sources employed to build
the multi-country survival analyses, namely the TK, NEEDS, World Bank economic and
governance data, and Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales
(CEPII) data. The variables used in these multi-county profitability analyses were broadly
similar to the variables used in the multi-country survival analyses, however the
dependent variables were a trichotomous profitability dependent variable and a
dichotomous profitability dependent variable (DV). The trichotomous profitability DV
was measured as 1 = gain, 2 = breakeven, and 3 = loss. The dichotomous profitability DV
was measured as 1 = gain and 0 = breakeven or loss.
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The subsidiary profitability measure was based on a managerial assessment of
profitability that has been demonstrated to have construct validity (Dess & Robinson,
1984). The subsidiary’s general manager or the equivalent provided this assessment in
response to a question in Toyo Keizai’s survey. The profitability question asked the
subsidiary general manager to classify the financial performance of the subsidiary into
one of three categories: loss, breakeven, or gain. The classification was an absolute
assessment of profitability made without reference to other subsidiaries of the MNE to
which the given subsidiary belonged.

4.2.1.1.

Testing Null Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b are essentially null hypotheses. In the strictest

sense, the null hypothesis must always be false, because no two real-world measures have
zero correlations between them (Lane et al., 1998). However, Field (2009) indicates that
one can test null hypotheses and be confident enough to fail to reject (or “accept”) the
null when the statistical test that one uses has enough statistical power to show that the
relationship between two phenomena that was thought to be a true relationship is instead
found to be trivial. He then defines the power of a statistical test as the probability that a
given test will find an effect assuming that one exists in the population. He also provides
guidelines, based on Cohen (1988, 1992), about the sample size recommended to achieve
the desired level of power and to detect small, medium, and large effect sizes. He then
recommends that statistical power be at least 0.8 (power = 1 – beta (0.2) = 0.8) so that
one will be 80% confident that one will find an effect when it exists or that there will be
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only 20% probability that one will make a Type II error of not detecting an effect when it
actually exists. With 0.8 power and an alpha-level of 0.5 one would need 783
observations to detect a small effect size (r = 0.1), 85 observations to detect a medium
effect size (r = 0.3), and 28 observations to detect a large effect size (r = 0.5) (Field,
2009). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that the sample size for the multi-country multinomial
and binary profitability analyses for year 2005 was 877. The sample sizes for the
replication analyses for years 2000 to 2008 ranged between 714 and 2021 observations.
These sample sizes are either in the acceptable range or much larger than the sample size
recommended to detect a small effect (r = 0.1) with 80% power. Thus, I can fail to reject
(or “accept”) this study’s null hypotheses if no significant results are found.

4.2.2.

Results
The descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations in Table 4.1 also apply to these

multi-country profitability analyses since the same covariates are used in these analyses.
Only SubExit, the multi-country survival analysis DV should be excluded from the table
since the DVs for the current analyses are the trichotomous and dichotomous profitability
DVs. Moreover, the sample sizes differ.
Regarding the multinomial and binomial logistic regression results, Tables 4.3
and 4.4 show the results for these analyses for the year 2005. I present the results of the
year 2005 (before the global financial crisis) to avoid possible bias from use of data from
years during or after that crisis. These tables clearly show that the overall models are
significant. For the multinomial logit, Table 4.3 shows that Chi-square = 114.869 and is
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highly significant (p < 0.001); and that R-square = 0.154. These results suggest that the
model reasonably explains the variance in the DV. Furthermore, several control variables
are significant. However, none of the main variables are significant.
Similarly, for the binomial logit, Table 4.4 shows that Chi-square = 78.276 and is
highly significant as well (p < 0.001); and that R-square = 0.122. These results also
suggest that the model reasonably explains the variance in the DV. The explanatory
power (R-square) decreased with the decrease in information in the DV (the DV changed
from being trichotomous to being dichotomous). Furthermore, several control variables
are significant. However, none of the main variables are significant.
Although, for the sake of parsimony, I do not present the multinomial and
binomial logistic regression results for all the years from 2000 to 2008, the results for
these replication years are broadly similar to the results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Only in
very few analyses, out of the total 18 analyses, did certain main variables appear
marginally significant or significant. With the level of statistical power used, the ability
to detect small effect sizes, and the replication of these results over several years and
using two logistic regression techniques, these analyses allow me to fail to reject (or
“accept”) the hypothesized null relationships. Thus, these results support H1b, H2b, H3b,
and H4b. Specifically, these results provide evidence that ownership, expatriates, risk,
and RHQ have negligible effects on foreign subsidiary profitability.
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Table 4.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Subsidiary Profitability in 2005
Variables
B
S.E.
Exp(B)
Gaining vs. Losing
Intercept
13.451***
3.855
LgSubAge
.657*
.335
1.929
LgSubEmployees
.520*
.262
1.682
SubSector (Manufacturing)
.477
.498
1.610
SubSector (Trading)
.944*
.472
2.571
SubSector (Reference: Services & Others)
LgParentEmployees
.534*
.263
1.706
ParentROA
.102***
.026
1.107
ParentSector (Manufacturing)
-.572
.514
.564
ParentSector (Trading)
-.535
.554
.586
ParentSector (Reference: Services & Others)
LgHostMarketSize
.005
.753
1.005
HostMarketPotential
-.008
.088
.992
InflationRate
-.051
.073
.950
GeogDistance
.000
.000
1.000
PoliticalStabilityRank
.018
.012
1.019
SubGeographicRegion (Asia)
-14.529***
1.259
.000
SubGeographicRegion (Europe)
-15.551***
1.024
.000
SubGeographicRegion (Latin America)
-15.320***
1.444
.000
SubGeographicRegion (MENA)
-14.787***
1.871
.000
SubGeographicRegion (North America)
-15.176***
.885
.000
SubGeographicRegion (Reference: Oceania)
LgParentOwnershipRatio
-.948
.702
.387
LgExpatNumber
-.262
.495
.769
LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio
2.511
1.835
12.322
SubGovernedByRHQ (No)
.038
.296
1.039
SubGovernedByRHQ (Reference: Yes)
Breakeven vs. Losing
Intercept
16.474***
4.147
LgSubAge
1.065**
.396
2.902
LgSubEmployees
.070
.295
1.072
SubSector (Manufacturing)
-.276
.558
.759
SubSector (Trading)
-.028
.529
.973
SubSector (Reference: Services & Others)
LgParentEmployees
.084
.300
1.088
ParentROA
.028
.028
1.029
ParentSector (Manufacturing)
.362
.571
1.436
ParentSector (Trading)
-.259
.630
.772
ParentSector (Reference: Services & Others)
LgHostMarketSize
-.571
.815
.565
HostMarketPotential
.049
.100
1.050
InflationRate
-.039
.081
.961
GeogDistance
.000
.000
1.000
PoliticalStabilityRank
.026*
.013
1.027
SubGeographicRegion (Asia)
-15.325***
1.112
.000
SubGeographicRegion (Europe)
-15.418***
.698
.000
SubGeographicRegion (Latin America)
-15.920***
1.362
.000
SubGeographicRegion (MENA)
-31.818
3518.233
.000
SubGeographicRegion (North America)
-15.545
.000
.000
SubGeographicRegion (Reference: Oceaniab)
LgParentOwnershipRatio
-.997
.796
.369
LgExpatNumber
-.304
.562
.738
LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio
1.761
2.074
5.820
SubGovernedByRHQ (No)
.281
.345
1.325
SubGovernedByRHQ (Reference: Yes)
-2 Log-Likelihood = 1281.481; Chi-Square = 114.689***; Nagelkerke R-squared = .154
Notes: Number of Observations = 877; Subsidiary Profitability was measured in 2005 and coded as 1 = Gaining; 2 = Breakeven; 3 =
Losing; The reference category is 3 = Losing; All covariates were measured in 2004 to create a 1 year lag between covariates and
dependent variable; SubGeographicRegion (Africa) is not in this model because there were no African subsidiaries with complete
data in the analysis for 2004; + p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (All two-tailed).
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Table 4.4 Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Subsidiary Profitability in 2005

Varaibles
B
S.E.
Exp(B)
Constant
-2.795
1.912
.061
LgSubAge
.015
.233
1.015
LgSubEmployees
.472 **
.170
1.603
SubSector (Reference: Manufacturing)
*
SubSector (Trading)
.291
.239
1.338
SubSector (Services & Others)
-.656 +
.354
.519
LgParentEmployees
.483 **
.171
1.621
ParentROA
.084 ***
.018
1.088
ParentSector (Reference: Manufacturing)
*
ParentSector (Trading)
.435 +
.237
1.545
ParentSector (Services & Others)
.799 *
.365
2.224
LgHostMarketSize
.371
.469
1.449
HostMarketPotential
-.041
.057
.960
InflationRate
-.020
.042
.981
GeogDistance
.000
.000
1.000
PoliticalStabilityRank
.001
.008
1.001
SubGeographicRegion (Reference: Asia)
SubGeographicRegion (Europe)
-.867 +
.490
.420
SubGeographicRegion (Latin America)
-.273
1.010
.761
SubGeographicRegion (MENA)
.621
1.429
1.861
SubGeographicRegion (North America)
-.415
.632
.660
SubGeographicRegion (Oceania)
-.570
.779
.565
LgParentOwnershipRatio
-.321
.437
.725
LgExpatNumber
-.047
.318
.954
LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio
1.379
1.245
3.971
SubGovernedByRHQ (Yes)
.125
.202
1.133
-2 Log Likelihood = 982.640
Chi-square = 78.276***
Nagelkerke R-square = .122
Number of Observations = 877
Notes: Subsidiary Profitability was measured in 2005 and coded as 1 = Gaining; 0 =
Breakeven or Losing; All covariates were measured in 2004 to create a 1 year lag
between the covariates and the dependent variable; SubGeographicRegion (Africa) is not
in this model because there were no African subsidiaries with complete data in the
analysis for 2004.
+ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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CHAPTER 5
5. DISCUSSION

The purpose of this thesis was to answer the following research questions: (1)
how do MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries to ensure better performance
(measured as foreign subsidiary survival and foreign subsidiary profitability), (2) why
they govern these foreign subsidiaries that way. I argued that MNE parent-foreign
subsidiary governance relationships are similar to principal-agent relationships, in that
both need to reduce / solve the agency problem. Thus, I drew on agency theory to build
my theoretical framework.
To answer the first research question, agency theory and prospect theory based
hypotheses were developed. Overall the statistical findings show that foreign subsidiaries
that are more likely to survive are governed by MNE parents through a higher number of
expatriates, higher parent ownership, lower risk, and regional headquarters (RHQ).
Further, the relative importance of these governance mechanisms follows the descending
order in which they are presented in the previous sentence. That is, the use of expatriates
is the most effective governance mechanism whereas the use of RHQs is the least
effective governance mechanism among these four significantly effective governance
mechanisms.
In addition, the findings suggest that the ownership and expatriates governance
mechanisms complement each other. Specifically, the effect of a parent’s higher
ownership on a subsidiary’s survival decreases as the number of expatriates in that
subsidiary increases.
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However, it is interesting that the findings show that although these four MNE
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms impact foreign subsidiary survival,
they do not necessarily impact foreign subsidiary profitability. This finding quantitatively
supports the qualitative insight provided by a seasoned governance expert whom I
interviewed while collecting qualitative data for this thesis.
To answer the second research question, I conducted interviews with subsidiary
CEOs, TMT members, and board members. Consistent with agency theory, I found that
MNE parents use ownership, expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ as foreign subsidiary
governance mechanisms to monitor their foreign subsidiaries’ behaviors. However,
beyond agency theory, but consistent with classical corporate governance, they use
subsidiary governance mechanisms such as expatriates and risk orientation to also direct
their foreign subsidiaries’ behaviors.

5.1. Research Implications
This study offers the following theoretical and empirical contributions. First, it
contributes to agency theory by advancing it in the following ways. Classical economic
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) embraces the following assumptions, among
others: (1) a single principal (shareholders), (2) a single agent (management), (3) the
principal and the agent are two distinct individuals or groups (in the case of two groups
the individuals within each group have homogeneous interests, goals, and behaviors), and
(4) the principal knows what is best for the firm and thus ideally creates an optimal
contract that ensures that the agent does what the principal thinks is best for the firm and
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then monitors the agent’s behavior (Shapiro, 2005). More recent agency theory research
in economics, political science, law, sociology, and business extends the above first two
assumptions and introduces multiple principals and multiple agents into agency-based
studies (Kiser, 1999; Shapiro, 2005; Waterman & Meier, 1998). To my knowledge, this
study is the first to combine agency theory and MNE corporate governance to explicitly
extend the above third assumption by conceptualizing MNE-parent managers and foreign
subsidiary expatriate managers as acting as principals and agents simultaneously.
This study does this in the following two ways. Firstly, classical agency theory
and corporate governance consider ownership as a governance mechanism used by
shareholders (principals) to govern the behavior of managers (agents). This study extends
agency theory by combining it with MNE governance to suggest that, in the context of
MNE

parent-foreign

subsidiary governance,

MNE-parent

managers,

who

act

simultaneously as agents to MNE shareholders and principals to foreign subsidiary
managers, use foreign subsidiary ownership as a governance mechanism to govern the
behavior of their foreign subsidiary managers. Domestic parent managers, who may also
act simultaneously as agents to their shareholders and principals to their domestic
subsidiary managers, may also use subsidiary ownership as a governance mechanism to
govern the behavior of their domestic subsidiary managers. However, to my knowledge
the literatures on international and domestic parent-subsidiary relationships neither
explicitly extend this third assumption nor unambiguously consider MNE or domestic
parent managers as acting as agents and principals simultaneously. Moreover, domestic
parents and their domestic subsidiaries are less geographically, economically, politically,
legally, etc. distant and are expected to have less divergent interests and goals than their
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(MNE) parent-(foreign) subsidiary counterparts. This makes domestic parent-subsidiary
agency problems minor compared to the more pronounced ones of their (MNE) parent(foreign) subsidiary counterparts. This, in turn, renders the simultaneous agent and
principal roles of MNE parent managers much more salient than those of their domestic
parent counterparts. Given that (MNE) parent-(foreign) subsidiary agency problems are
more pronounced than those of their domestic parent-subsidiary counterparts I expect
MNEs to rely more on subsidiary ownership as a subsidiary governance mechanism than
their domestic counterparts, especially given that, with lower agency problems, domestic
parents could govern their domestic subsidiaries by relying more on non-ownership
governance mechanisms (Schaan, 1988).
Secondly, agency theory similarly considers managers as agents to owners or
principals. This study extends agency theory and the expatriate literature by suggesting
that expatriates, who are usually subsidiary managers, simultaneously act as agents
(subsidiary managers) to headquarters and principals (subsidiary governors representing
the parent) to foreign subsidiaries. Future research may need to investigate how such
principal and agent managers resolve and integrate their personal internal agency
conflicts.
Furthermore, expatriates, being not only parent agents but simultaneously
subsidiary principals, can go beyond agency theory’s prediction as acting only as parent
controllers for their subsidiary’s behaviors, to having a role as governors of their
subsidiary’s strategy. This extends the above fourth assumption of agency theory that
predicts that the expatriate (agent) will be passive and just do what the parent believes is
best for the subsidiary, to suggest that the expatriate will be proactive and do what (s)he
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believes is best for the subsidiary and MNE parent overall. Such a proactive behavior
would be more similar to corporate governance’s prediction that corporate board
members act not only as monitors of management’s behavior but also as directors of
corporate strategy.
Second, this study contributes to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
by extending it from the individual level to the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary level.
More specifically, prospect theory attempts to explain individual decisions under risk.
This study extends it to an international business context to explain the relationship
between MNE parent-foreign subsidiary risk orientation and foreign subsidiary survival.
The pilot study advances prospect theory by showing when foreign subsidiaries behave in
a rational manner and when they behave in a biased manner. It shows that moderate risktakers, that is rational actors, increase their survival likelihood by taking more moderate
risks than their industry peers, whereas extreme risk-averters and excessive risk-seekers,
that is biased actors, decrease their survival likelihood by increasing their risk-aversion
and increasing their risk-seeking than their industry peers respectively.
Third, this study contributes to corporate governance research by extending it in
the following ways. Conceptually, it advances corporate governance studies by widening
their scope to parent-subsidiary governance and broadening its mechanisms to include
intra-organizational governance mechanisms, such as parent-subsidiary ownership,
expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ. The classical corporate governance literature
typically studies internal (e.g. monitoring by the board of directors, compensation,
internal audits, etc.) and external (e.g. market for corporate control, media pressure,
government regulations, etc.) corporate governance mechanisms to the domestic firm.
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This study extends the corporate governance literature by studying a third group of
mechanisms, namely, intra-organizational governance mechanisms between parent and
subsidiaries of the MNE. Moreover, conceptually it advances corporate governance by
borrowing the concept of risk governance from sister disciplines such as political science
and public policy and redefining it to serve as a valuable concept in corporate governance
in the business sector.
Empirically, it advances corporate governance research by conducting one of the
first empirical and multi-method studies on MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance
and by showing that MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance matters. However it was
also found that MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance impacts foreign subsidiary
survival but not necessarily foreign subsidiary profitability, a distinction that has not been
made before either in the MNE governance literature or in the classical corporate
governance literature. Previous findings on the relationship between corporate
governance and performance have been mixed (for examples see: Dalton, Daily,
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004; Larcker et al.,
2007). Making the distinction between these two kinds of performance may help explain
why. Moreover, the few previous studies related to MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance and performance are mostly conceptual and / or qualitative (e.g. Adams,
1996; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Kim et al., 2005; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). This study
provides quantitative as well as qualitative evidence supporting the impact of subsidiary
governance on subsidiary survival but not profitability. Furthermore, it empirically
advances the field of MNE and subsidiary governance by utilizing advanced multi-
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methods, including advanced survival analysis logistic regression methods that have not
been used in this area before.
In addition, empirically the pilot study advances risk research by showing that the
relationship between firm risk and survival is nonlinear rather than linear. This may
explain why previous findings on the relationship between risk and performance are
contradictory (for examples see: Bowman, 1980; Fama & French, 1992; Fletcher, 2000;
Henkel, 2009; Nickel & Rodriguez, 2002; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991). This may also
reconcile the findings of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that suggest that the
relationship between risk and performance is positive (Sharpe, 1964) and the findings of
Bowman’s paradox that suggest that the relationship between risk and performance is
negative (Bowman, 1980) by explaining the conditions that change the sign of this
relationship.

5.2. Practical Implications
This study offers practical implications for directors and managers. The findings
can help MNE and subsidiary directors and managers make better MNE parent-foreign
subsidiary governance decisions. For instance, the first finding shows that a parent’s level
of ownership in its foreign subsidiary increases the survival likelihood of that subsidiary
although at a decreasing rate. This broadly suggests that if MNE directors and managers
want to increase the survival likelihood of their foreign subsidiaries they would be
advised to have a higher level of ownership as a governance mechanism in these
subsidiaries. However, the marginal utility of increasing their level of ownership in these
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foreign subsidiaries decreases as their ownership in these subsidiaries increases. Thus
they may wish to operate international joint ventures (IJVs) in which they own a material
equity share, as well as wholly owned subsidiaries. These recommendations are
consistent with previous findings that suggest once an MNE parent owns 40% or more in
an IJV, the survival likelihood of that IJV is not much different than that of a wholly
owned subsidiary (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004).
The second finding shows that the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary
increases the survival likelihood of a subsidiary although at a decreasing rate. This
broadly suggests that having more expatriates in a foreign subsidiary would generally
increase the survival likelihood of that subsidiary, however beyond an optimal number of
expatriates, the marginal subsidiary survival benefit of having an additional expatriate in
the subsidiary decreases gradually. This may be attributed to the high cost of expatriates
relative to their marginal benefit as their number increases in subsidiaries. This finding is
consistent with previous findings suggesting broadly that the number or percentage of
expatriates positively influences subsidiary performance (Fang, Jiang, Makino, &
Beamish, 2010; Gong, 2003; Very, Hébert, & Beamish, 2004). However, some studies
suggest that MNEs may be gradually using fewer conventional expatriates in their foreign
subsidiaries (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; Collings et al., 2007; Kobrin, 1988) for various
reasons. Therefore one must view this suggestion as a broad recommendation and must
consider all the idiosyncrasies of each subsidiary and the availability, cost, and other
limits on the use of expatriates before deciding on the specific number of expatriates to
send to each subsidiary.
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The third finding, from the main study, suggests that an MNE parent’s level of
risk decreases the survival likelihood of its foreign subsidiaries, although at a decreasing
rate. Thus, if MNE directors and managers want to increase the survival likelihood of
their foreign subsidiaries they would be advised to follow a risk-averse or moderate risk
taking orientation as opposed to an excessive risk-seeking orientation, at the headquarters
as well as at the subsidiary level (see Figure 3.1).
The fourth finding indicates that foreign subsidiaries governed by RHQ are more
likely to survive than their counterparts that are not governed by RHQ. This provides an
internal additional benefit to the use of RHQs.
The fifth finding, related to the relative importance of the different MNE parentforeign subsidiary governance mechanisms, suggests that if directors and managers want
to benefit from a larger governance impact on foreign subsidiary survival, they may want
to use the most effective among the governance mechanisms investigated in this thesis,
namely expatriates. However, if they are content with smaller governance impact that
would still influence foreign subsidiary survival, it may be sufficient to use RHQs as
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms.
The sixth finding, that the ownership and expatriates governance mechanisms
interact with each other to influence foreign subsidiary survival, suggests that directors
and managers may substitute / complement ownership with expatriates and vice versa to
impact subsidiary survival. This may further suggest that broadly directors and managers
may be able to substitute / complement certain governance mechanisms with others to
impact firm performance in general.
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The final interesting finding is that, although MNE parent-foreign subsidiary
governance mechanisms impact foreign subsidiary survival, they do not necessarily
impact foreign subsidiary profitability. This finding may be attributed to the fact that
governance mechanisms consistently discipline a company and ensure that it does not
make decisions that are detrimental to its survival. However, a company needs a
sustained entrepreneurial spirit to grow and prosper financially.

5.3. Limitations and Future Directions
This thesis has the following limitations. First, one limitation of this thesis is
related to its subsidiary performance measures. One way this thesis measures subsidiary
performance is as subsidiary survival. Although this is a legitimate measure for longer
term firm performance (Combs, Crook, & Shook, 2005; Fischer & Pollock, 2004) that
has been used in numerous studies (e.g. Delios and Beamish (2001), Gaur and Lu (2007),
Kim et al. (2012), etc.), a limitation of this thesis’ data is that the data does not
differentiate between subsidiary exits due to dissolution or underperformance on the one
hand and those due to divestiture even when the subsidiary is performing well on the
other. Future research may need to account for this distinction, although one would
expect the number of exits due to divestiture when a subsidiary is performing well to be
small relative to the number of exits due to the other two reasons. As a matter of fact,
previous research on intended and unintended IJV and wholly owned subsidiary
termination provides evidence that most IJVs are terminated due to unintended business
failure and that IJV parents usually do not terminate successful joint ventures. Further,
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changes in external conditions (misleading demand and competition from local firms) are
the generic causes of unintended termination for all types of foreign subsidiaries, IJVs
and wholly owned subsidiaries (Makino, Chan, Isobe, & Beamish, 2007).
Moreover, another way this thesis measures subsidiary performance is as
subsidiary profitability. In this thesis subsidiary profitability is measured as a
trichotomous or dichotomous categorical variable indicating the subsidiary manager’s
report of whether the subsidiary has gained, broke-even, or lost during a specific period.
Future research may need to measure subsidiary performance using continuous variables
such as subsidiary growth or market share to capture more information in the subsidiary
performance variable and consequently provide better governance-performance
predictions. One of the limitations of this thesis data is that it did not provide subsidiary
market share data.
Second, the findings of this thesis provide general recommendations on how
MNE parents can use select MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms to
improve their foreign subsidiaries’ survival. To provide such general recommendations
this thesis controls for a range of variables that may vary among subsidiaries. However, it
does not consider conditions that predict when to use which governance mechanism. The
purpose of this thesis was to provide mainly (because it also provides at least one
contingency performance prediction) universalistic, as compared to contingency or
configurational, performance predictions (Delery & Doty, 1996). These mainly
universalistic findings can be foundational for more contingency and configurational
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance-performance future research predictions.
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Third, this thesis conceptualizes expatriates as “employees coming from an
MNE’s headquarters or other entities and working in a foreign-country subsidiary of that
MNE.” However, due to data limitations it operationalizes expatriates as employees in
the foreign subsidiary coming from the Japanese MNE parent. By using this proxy
measure this thesis could not identify expatriates coming from sister subsidiaries.
Expatriates from different origins (e.g. countries other than Japan, headquarters, or sister
subsidiaries) may have different governance effects on subsidiary performance. Future
research may need to identify the different origins of expatriates and account for their
differential governance effects on subsidiary performance.
Fourth, this thesis studied only Japanese MNEs. Future research should replicate
this study with data from numerous MNEs in a diverse set of cultures (e.g. U.S. MNEs,
European MNEs, etc.) to ensure the wider generalizability of its findings. Japanese
MNEs may have a unique governance structure, especially when they are parts of
Keiretsus (Berglöf & Perotti, 1994). Future research needs to distinguish between
Keiretsu and non-Keiretsu Japanese MNEs and this factor’s impact on their governance
mechanisms and performance.
Fifth, a foreign subsidiary’s purpose / mandate may influence its parentsubsidiary governance mechanisms and performance (Birkinshaw, 1996; Schotter &
Beamish, 2011b). For instance, the purpose / mandate of certain subsidiaries may not
necessarily be to seek profits but to seek resources, two mandates that may influence
parent-subsidiary governance and subsidiary survival / profitability differently. This
thesis did not account for this ‘subsidiary purpose’ factor. Future research needs to
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distinguish between the different subsidiary mandates and their effects on parentsubsidiary governance and performance.
Sixth, in this thesis risk orientation was measured as the sector-adjusted debt ratio
in which the debt ratio was measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. This debt
ratio measure has been previously used as a proxy measure of firm risk. Although it
captures financial risk it does not necessarily capture other types of risk such as operating
risk, political risk, etc. Future research may need to develop a more complex
multidimensional risk measure that can more accurately capture a wider range of firm
risks.
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APPENDIX B: INTRODUCTION LETTER AND CONSENT FORM
Introduction Letter: Subsidiary Governance of Foreign Multinationals
Dear Mr. ____________,
My name is Bassam Farah. I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Ivey Business School,
Western University. As part of my doctoral thesis, I am working with my supervisor
Professor Paul W. Beamish on a research study that investigates subsidiary governance
mechanisms of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
The purpose of this study is to better understand if and how subsidiary managers
and/or directors influence subsidiary governance mechanisms. We are specifically
interested in how expatriate staffing, ownership structures, and business risk play a role
in the overall governance, and how this affects performance. We are confident that the
results of our work will help to inform managers and directors at MNE foreign
subsidiaries and headquarters about how to optimize governance structures.
We believe that your company would be a good research site and that the results
of our study would be interesting to you as an executive. Thus we are asking you to
participate in this study. Once completed, we would of course share the aggregate results
of the study with you, if you were interested. If you agree to participate in this study we
would like to set up an appointment for a 45-minute interview. This interview could be
conducted in person, but preferably by phone. Your name and the name of your
organization will remain strictly anonymous throughout this study. Your participation is
entirely voluntary and not compensated. You will be asked questions related to the above
topic.
In case you have any questions on the procedure for this study or your rights as a
participant, please feel free to contact the supervisor for this study, Professor Paul W.
Beamish (Phone: 519-661-3237; Email: pbeamish@ivey.ca) or the Office of Research
Ethics, Western University (Phone: 519-661-3036; Email: ethics@uwo.ca). You can keep
this letter for your record. Your signature on the consent form indicates your consent to
participate in the study. During the interview you may choose not to answer any
question(s), or withdraw from participating at any time. All collected information will be
strictly confidential. This study does not involve any known risks. A total of 10-15
individuals are expected to participate in this stage of the study.
Please feel free to reach me at 661-771-6571 or at bfarah.phd@ivey.ca if you
have any questions, and also if you would like a copy of the publications generated from
this study.
Sincerely,
Dr. Bassam Farah PhD Psy, MA Psy, MBA
Ph.D. Candidate International Business & Strategy
Ivey Business School
Western University
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7
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Office: 0N05D
Office: 661-771-6571
Mobile: 226-448-0610
Email: bfarah.phd@ivey.ca

Consent Form
Research Project: Interviews on “Subsidiary Governance of Foreign Multinationals”.
I have read the introduction letter, and agree to participate. All questions have
been answered to my satisfaction.
Name:
Signature:
Date:
I am interested in receiving the results of this study: YES/NO.

Researcher: Bassam Farah
Signature:
Date:
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE
Overarching Research Question(s):
How do you influence the changes in your subsidiary’s governance mechanisms /
structures, namely the use of expatriates, ownership, and risk?
Why do you attempt to influence the changes in these governance mechanisms /
structures (i.e. the use of expatriates, ownership, and risk) in your subsidiary?
How does your parent use these governance mechanisms (i.e. ownership, expatriates, and
risk) to govern your subsidiary?
Interview Questions:
Name:
Position:
Date started (and ended) position:
Is the subsidiary manager an expatriate or not: yes or no
Subsidiary location:
1.
1.1.
How was your subsidiary set up in terms of ownership (i.e. nationality of owners,
number of owners, number of shares for each owner, percentage of shares for each
owner, etc.)?
1.2.
Why do you think was it set up that way?
1.3.
Who made these decisions (i.e. headquarters, regional headquarters, subsidiary,
etc.)?
1.4.
Do you have any influence on these decisions? If so, what kind of influence?
1.5.
In the past, have you taken any initiative(s) to influence the changes in ownership
in your subsidiary? If so, what were these initiatives? What were their outcomes? Why
did you take them?
1.6.
In the future, how would you influence the changes in ownership in your
subsidiary? And why?
1.7.
Do you believe you should have more or less influence on these decisions? Why,
and in what way?
1.8.
How does your parent use ownership to govern your subsidiary?
2.
2.1.
How was your subsidiary set up in terms of expatriates (i.e. nationality, number,
percentage, positions, etc.)?
2.2.
Why do you think was it set up that way?
2.3.
Who made these decisions (i.e. headquarters, regional headquarters, subsidiary,
etc.)?
2.4.
Do you have any influence on these decisions? If so, what kind of influence?
2.5.
In the past, have you taken any initiative(s) to influence the changes in expatriates
in your subsidiary? If so, what were these initiatives? What were their outcomes? Why
did you take them?
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2.6.
In the future, how would you influence the changes in expatriates in your
subsidiary? And why?
2.7.
Do you believe you should have more or less influence on these decisions? Why,
and in what way?
2.8.
How does your parent use expatriates to govern your subsidiary?
3.
3.1.
How was your subsidiary set up in terms of risk guidelines [level of liquidity
(liquidity ratio = current assets / current liabilities), level of (total) debt (debt ratio = total
liabilities / total assets), level of interest coverage (times interest earned ratio = earnings
before interest and tax / interest expense), credit terms, etc.]?
3.2.
Why do you think was it set up that way?
3.3.
Who made these decisions (i.e. headquarters, regional headquarters, subsidiary,
etc.)?
3.4.
Do you have any influence on these decisions? If so, what kind of influence?
3.5.
In the past, have you taken any initiative(s) to influence the changes in risk
orientation in your subsidiary? If so, what were these initiatives? What were their
outcomes? Why did you take them?
3.6.
In the future, how would you influence the changes in risk orientation in your
subsidiary? And why?
3.7.
Do you believe you should have more or less influence on these decisions? Why,
and in what way?
3.8.
How does your parent use risk guidelines to govern your subsidiary?
4.
4.1.
In your subsidiary, do you find evidence for or against the relationship between
subsidiary governance (e.g. the use of ownership, expatriates, and risk) and subsidiary
survival and / or profitability? What kind of evidence / relationship? Why do you think
this evidence exists or does not exist?
4.2.
How (& why) do you think your subsidiary governance mechanisms (e.g.
expatriates, ownership, risk orientation, etc.) affect your subsidiary’s survival and / or
profitability?
4.3.
In your experience, which subsidiary governance mechanisms are most effective,
why?
5.
5.1.
How would you improve foreign subsidiary governance?
5.2.
Do you have any documents about your company that you can provide that may
include relevant governance information that may be useful for this research?
5.3.
Is there anyone at headquarters who may be willing to give me a headquarters
perspective on subsidiary governance? If so, please can you connect me with this person?
5.4.
Do you know any other subsidiary managers who may be willing to participate as
an interviewee for this research?
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